Tag: net zero

  • Climate change mitigation: should adaptation come first?

    Climate change mitigation: should adaptation come first?

    Motion in the climate change mitigation debate: climate policy should now focus on adaptation, not mitigation

    Debated: 7 September 2026, Ye Olde Cock Tavern, Fleet Street

    Format: main debate, proposer and opposer, floor speeches

    Britain spent the summer of 2026 under hosepipe bans. In September the Sylvans asked what climate policy should do next, debating whether it should now focus on adaptation, not mitigation. In effect the motion put climate change mitigation itself on trial. Is cutting emissions worth the cost to a country producing a fraction of them, or should Britain build reservoirs, flood walls and power stations instead? A show of hands before the speeches put nine in favour and five against.

    The proposer in the climate change mitigation debate: adapt at home first

    Peter Hulme Cross proposed the motion and Ian opposed it. The proposer opened with the summer just gone: five heatwaves, a national hosepipe ban and households in Kent flushing with bottled water. For a country with plentiful rainfall, they argued, that was a failure of planning. No reservoir had been built in 30 years, and London’s desalination plant at Beckton sat mothballed because it was too expensive to run. Flood defences, for areas from Somerset to Great Yarmouth, were nowhere on the government’s agenda.

    A near-blackout and the case for gas

    On 23 June, the evening of England’s World Cup match against Ghana, the sun had set, the wind had dropped and two gas plants were down. The grid operator NESO, the proposer claimed, had to ask France for power to avert a blackout. Wind and solar are intermittent, and Britain is far behind on nuclear, so for now it needs more gas and gas storage, not less. They cited £3.2 billion this year for paying wind farms to switch off when the grid cannot take their output.

    Net zero as a slogan, and the refinery problem

    Climate change is science, the proposer said, but net zero by 2050 is a political programme: a virtuous destination announced without saying how to get there or who pays. The UK produces 0.74 per cent of global emissions, they claimed, and cutting that further will not change the climate.

    Refineries were the worked example. Britain has lost two in little more than a year, the proposer argued, because carbon pricing makes domestic refining dearer than imports. Demand does not disappear, so the emissions move abroad and rise in transit. They called this economic vandalism and urged Britain to stop trying to save the planet and adapt.

    The opposer in the climate change mitigation debate: cure the illness

    The opposer began with a patient told that a toxic habit is destroying their organs. Putting adaptation first, they argued, is asking for stronger painkillers while carrying on with the poison. With 1.1 degrees of warming locked in, passing 1.5 risked tipping points such as the collapse of polar ice sheets and the Amazon. Adaptation is necessary, the opposer conceded, before setting out four arguments against the motion.

    The hard limits of adaptation

    Above a wet-bulb temperature of 35 degrees, the opposer argued, the body cannot cool itself, and no engineering protects people working outdoors. A glacier collapse on the Nepal-Tibet border showed a geological limit, and a UK government report on biodiversity loss warned that collapsing ecosystems cannot be adapted around.

    Climate change mitigation as cheaper adaptation

    The technology exists and gets cheaper with use, the opposer said. On cooperation they cited the Montreal Protocol, which left the ozone layer healing, and claimed that since the Paris Agreement net zero pledges have come to cover 83 per cent of the global economy. A modest sea level rise is a standard engineering job; an unchecked one demands multi-billion-pound barriers.

    Growth without the emissions

    More than 40 advanced economies have grown while cutting emissions since 1990, according to the opposer, and the sacrifices fall mainly on a wealthy minority who fly. Adaptation is how we survive damage already done. Mitigation is how we keep a world worth adapting to.

    Voices from the floor in the climate change mitigation debate: who acts, and who pays

    A warming climate whatever we do

    The first floor speaker backed the proposer for different reasons. Roman vineyards reached further north than modern ones, they argued, and New Scientist had charted many periods warmer and colder than now. The climate oscillates and will keep warming regardless, so coping is all that can be done. A second speaker, once a CND member, agreed: every energy source brings problems, and like a cancer caught late, it was probably too late to do anything but adapt.

    Energy sovereignty and the global south

    A third speaker opened with Nepal, which, citing the UN, they said has lost close to a third of its mountain ice in 30 years. Their answer to the motion was both. The deciding issue was energy sovereignty: Britain has swapped dependence on the Middle East for dependence on Norway and the United States, and only clean energy ends that. They described American policy on Venezuela and Iran as a push to control hydrocarbons.

    Cumulative emissions and the duty to lead

    One speaker compared letting climate change run to calls in 2020 to end lockdown and let whoever survives survive. Quoting a UN report on overshooting 1.5 degrees, they argued that every fraction of a degree avoided saves lives, and that the real risk is to food security. Britain, which started emitting earliest, cannot tell India or Nigeria to cut while pleading its 1 per cent.

    A tragedy of the commons

    The next speaker sided with the proposer in the short term and the opposer in the long. Climate change is a tragedy of the commons, they argued, and any gas Britain burns should be its own. The CFC comparison was flawed, because giving up CFCs cost nobody anything, while China giving up coal would cost a great deal. Britain’s share also leaves out emissions embedded in its imports.

    Fusion, precedent and fairness

    A newcomer urged investment in nuclear fusion and argued that a Britain reaching net zero would deny larger countries the excuse that it cannot be done. It is unfair, they added, that rich countries emit and poorer ones suffer.

    Consumerism and producing at home

    Another speaker blamed a consumerist system in which replacing a washing machine is cheaper than repairing it. Asked from the floor whether they would accept higher UK emissions to cut global ones, they said yes where local production makes economic sense, wondering why Britain both exports and imports beef. Their last proposal was to stop wars.

    Per capita emissions and British soft power

    After the break a speaker took on the 1 per cent argument directly. Per capita emissions are the fairer measure, they argued, by the logic that has people mocking celebrities’ private jets. They rejected a little island mentality: Britain sits on the UN Security Council and has soft power to spare. Wealthy countries create the demand that makes new technology cheap, they said, citing Pakistan’s turn to Chinese solar panels.

    The cost of climate change mitigation, and of not acting

    The next speaker disputed the history: no period in the past thousand years was warmer than today, they said. They answered the proposer’s questions about cost with figures they attributed to the OBR, £1.4 trillion gross for net zero over 30 years and £344 billion net, and cited Lord Stern’s estimate that inaction would cost 7.4 per cent of GDP by 2100. Adaptation was the cost nobody had priced. Patriots, they added, ought to want Britain to lead.

    Living more local lives

    One speaker in favour of the motion argued that Britain is badly unadapted in how it lives. Drawing on dating profiles, they described a culture obsessed with travel and food, and urged regional railways, local holidays and less frivolous use of AI and its data centres. People might have to be priced out of cheap flights. Britain, they said, is like Germany in 1910, enjoying Mozart with no idea what is coming.

    Public goods, private goods and who pays

    The longest exchange of the evening followed. One speaker framed mitigation as a public good, of which Britain recovers perhaps 1 per cent of what it spends, and adaptation as a private good that pays back at home. They cited Chinese nickel processing in Indonesia, which they claimed pumps acid into the sea, as evidence that others do not share Western priorities.

    Asked who should pay to adapt poorer countries, they said those countries would have to pay themselves. Pressed on whether that was fair, they conceded it obviously was not.

    Poverty first

    Another speaker called the whole debate a luxury. More than half the world lives on little more than $8 a day, they claimed, and poor countries’ leaders care about poverty, not British net zero. A comfortable room discussing adaptation and mitigation, they concluded, was pathetic.

    Local resilience and a debt owed

    The last floor speaker argued for both: mitigation at scale, adaptation locally. The West owes the developing world for the exploitation behind its wealth, they said, but with little hope of meaningful mitigation, small communities would have to support each other. Anyone wanting to see Venice should go soon.

    Closing arguments in the climate change mitigation debate: the opposer

    The opposer’s reply concentrated on energy. Gas sets the British electricity price 98 per cent of the time, they claimed, against 7 per cent in France, and in February 2026 solar cost £65 a megawatt against £89 to £100 for gas. Britain imports 43 per cent of its fossil fuels, so renewables are the route to energy sovereignty. They pointed to a planned British carbon border price and EU right-to-repair rules as policies already working.

    Closing arguments in the climate change mitigation debate: the proposer

    The proposer explained that the opening had focused on Britain deliberately, because that is the perspective the room shares. India and China burn coal on a vast scale, they argued, and will not follow a British example. Taxing energy only makes Britain weaker and more dependent on imports. The proposer dismissed the OBR and LSE as unreliable and claimed renewable prices hide enormous subsidies.

    On fairness they were blunt: life is not fair, and fairness is a concept people invent when things go against them. Climate change is here, and Britain must adapt whether it likes it or not.

    The final vote in the climate change mitigation debate

    The motion was not carried. Seven voted for it, eight against and five abstained, against nine in favour and five opposed at the opening show of hands. That is a reversal: the motion led going in and lost by a single vote, though the room was larger at the end than at the start, so the two counts are not the same electorate. The chair called it a razor-thin margin.

    The house agreed, narrowly, that adapting to a warming world is no substitute for trying to slow it.

    Why the climate change mitigation motion failed

    By eight votes to seven, with five abstentions, a motion that led by four at the opening show of hands was defeated. The proposition made the more concrete case and the opposition the more complete one. Over a long floor debate the argument moved from what Britain should build to who is responsible for the problem, and on that ground the proposer’s national frame came under steady pressure.

    The proposition’s case: water, power and proportion

    The opening speech was built from the particular. Kent without water, Beckton mothballed, a blackout averted on the night of a World Cup match: each example was local, recent and hard to dispute in the room. It made adaptation sound like ordinary competent government rather than surrender, and that was the speech’s main strength.

    The second half made a different argument. The refinery example and the 0.74 per cent figure argued less for adaptation than against net zero as currently pursued, and it was this half the floor took up. Several later speakers answered the 1 per cent point directly; nobody engaged with the reservoirs. The case for adaptation was left almost entirely to the proposer, while the case against mitigation drew fire from every side.

    The closing held to the national frame and supplied the most quotable line of the evening. ‘Life is not fair’ was candid and consistent with everything the proposer had said. It arrived, though, after a floor speaker had been made to answer the fairness question aloud and had conceded it. Its rhetorical effect was to give up the moral ground the opposition had been claiming all evening rather than contest it.

    The opposition’s case: limits, cost and cooperation

    The opposer’s opening was the most structured speech of the night, with four arguments announced and delivered in order. The patient analogy set the terms early: adaptation as painkillers, mitigation as the cure. By conceding at once that adaptation is necessary, the opposer turned the motion into a question of priority, and made the words ‘not mitigation’ the part the proposition had to defend.

    Its weakness was distance. Wet-bulb temperatures, Himalayan glaciers and global GDP did not meet the proposer’s Kent and Beckton on the same ground. The closing corrected that. It answered the energy argument with British prices and British import figures, recast renewables as energy sovereignty, and pointed to policies already under way. The opposition finished on the proposer’s home territory, arguing that mitigation was itself a way of protecting Britain.

    One part of the opening case took damage from the floor. The Montreal Protocol was offered as proof that countries can act together, and a floor speaker answered that giving up CFCs had cost nobody anything, whereas asking China to give up coal would cost a great deal. The opposer did not return to the point. It left the claim that cooperation is possible resting on the Paris pledges alone, which the proposer’s closing attacked through India’s and China’s coal.

    The ebb and flow of the floor in the climate change mitigation debate

    Across 13 floor speeches, four battlegrounds emerged.

    Britain’s 1 per cent. The proposer’s figure for Britain’s share of emissions was the most contested claim of the evening. Speakers answered it with cumulative emissions, per capita emissions, emissions embedded in imports and Britain’s diplomatic weight. Two defended it on its own terms: one as a public good from which Britain would recover a sliver of its spending, another as negligible beside world poverty. By the closing, the proposer was making the point again through India and China rather than through Britain’s share.

    Natural variation. Two early speakers argued that the climate has always changed and that adapting is all that remains. After the break another speaker disputed the historical claim with temperature figures. Nobody returned to it, so the strongest version of the case that mitigation is pointless was left standing on contested ground.

    Who pays. Poorer countries ran through the evening and came to a head in the exchange over whether they should fund their own adaptation. The admission that this was obviously not fair was the one moment where a speaker leaning towards the motion gave ground in public. The proposer’s closing answered that fairness does not exist, which held the position without winning the point back.

    Both. Several floor speakers said the answer was both. That was in effect the opposer’s own position, which granted adaptation a place while denying it priority. A room that kept saying both was, on the motion’s own wording, declining to say ‘not mitigation’.

    The climate change mitigation case built from the floor

    The opposition’s best argument on cost came from the floor rather than from the opener. Figures for the net cost of net zero set against the cost of inaction answered the question the proposer had posed at the start, and asked a new one: what does adaptation cost? No speaker for the motion offered a number.

    The proposition’s sharpest floor contribution, mitigation as a public good and adaptation as a private one, was never answered on its own terms. It was overtaken by the exchange on fairness that followed it, and by the time the closings came the room was discussing obligation rather than return on investment.

    The proposition’s other strong material from the floor pulled in two directions at once. One supporter argued that the climate warms whatever Britain does, which made climate change mitigation pointless. Another argued that Britons should fly less, eat locally and use less AI, which is mitigation by another name. Both spoke for the motion, but the second speech made the opposer’s point that the two cannot be separated more vividly than the opposer had.

    What the climate change mitigation debate left unexamined

    The proposer’s practical programme was barely debated. Reservoirs, flood defences, gas storage and grid upgrades were set out in detail at the start, and no speaker on either side argued against any of them. The opposition never claimed Britain should not build reservoirs. A debate about priority might have asked whether money spent on carbon pricing was money not spent on flood walls, and nobody costed that trade.

    Nuclear power appeared on both sides, as the proposer’s preferred baseline and as part of the opposer’s low-carbon mix, and the agreement went unremarked. The motion’s word ‘now’ also went unexamined: whether the balance should shift today, or whether, after a summer of hosepipe bans, it already has.

    What drove the result

    The room did not divide on whether to adapt. It divided on whether adapting meant giving up on mitigation, and the motion’s ‘not mitigation’ asked it to say yes. Most of the floor said both, and the opposer had made both into the opposition’s case within the first minutes.

    The shift from nine to five in favour to seven to eight against cannot be read as persuasion, because the room grew between the votes. What can be said is where the argument went. It travelled from Kent to the world’s poorest countries, from Britain’s share of emissions to Britain’s responsibility for them, and the proposer’s closing chose to hold the national frame rather than follow. The house accepted that Britain must adapt, and declined to say it should stop trying to reduce the need.

    Full transcript of the climate change mitigation debate

    Read the full transcript

    The climate change mitigation motion, and the opening show of hands

    The motion for tonight: climate policy should now focus on adaptation, not mitigation. On this one, people might have a pre-formed view, so let’s take a pre-vote. I’ll read the motion again. Climate policy should now focus on adaptation, not mitigation. All those currently in favour, please raise your hand. You don’t have to vote, but if you’re currently in favour of the motion, you can vote. And all those opposed currently? Okay, so we do have a split. We’ll look at whether there’s any swing at the end of the debate.

    The proposition: reservoirs, floods and a near-blackout

    Mr Chairman and fellow Sylvans, well, we’ve had a hot, dry summer. Five heatwaves, a hosepipe ban over most of the country, parts of Kent cut off from water for days at a time, having to wash, cook, clean and flush the toilet with bottled water. Imagine that. This is a country with plentiful rainfall. We need more reservoirs, if only to keep up with population growth. There hasn’t been one in the last 30 years. London is short of water. There’s been talk of a new reservoir at Abingdon in Oxfordshire for as long as I can remember, but it hasn’t happened yet. And London does have a desalination plant at Beckton, which can purify water for up to a million people. But guess what? It’s mothballed. It has been since it was built, because it’s too expensive to run. It uses electricity. Well, we’ll come back to that.

    There are also a surprising number of areas prone to flooding: Somerset, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, but also Cumbria, Cornwall, Hull and Great Yarmouth. And flooding is very destructive. We need better flood defences, especially as extra rainfall is predicted for this coming winter. But I don’t see it on the government’s agenda.

    Now, on the 23rd of June last, just before 8pm, when certain of us were settling down to watch the World Cup match against Ghana, a crisis was unfolding at NESO, the National Energy System Operator. The sun had set, so there was very little energy from solar, if any. The wind had dropped, so very little from the wind. Two of the gas-fired power plants were out of commission, and there was not enough energy being generated to meet the demand. So there was a panicked phone call to their counterparts in France: could they please supply us with energy across the interconnector? The French obligingly said yes, and so a blackout was averted at the last minute. Not often we can say the French have come to the rescue, but they did on this occasion. For a price, of course.

    Now, wind is intermittent; it blows, and there can be a lull for days. Solar is intermittent; it can be bright or obscured by cloud. There has to be something to provide a baseline to plug the gaps, and that is gas-fired power stations, which provide that function. Ideally it would be nuclear, but we are very far behind with nuclear. The government has only just approved a drawing-board plan for mini nuclear reactors, and Sizewell C is way over budget and well beyond its scheduled time. So we need more gas, not less, to tide us over the next few months and years, and yet the government is reluctant to invest in gas storage and wants to phase out gas entirely. Our European neighbours are stocking up their supplies of gas while we dither, as usual.

    Well, where does our gas come from? Mainly from Norway, since the route from Qatar is blocked. Now, Norway exploits its oil and gas fields, including inside the Arctic Circle, and sells it to us, while we refuse to exploit our own oil and gas fields. Although, to be fair, the Jackdaw field may possibly be reopened soon.

    But another factor is the transmission network, which we call the National Grid. This was never designed for wind and solar, and it urgently needs upgrading. Well, this is happening; it’s ongoing, but it will take years. And there are times when wind and solar generate so much electricity that the grid cannot handle it, and NESO has to ask the operating companies to switch them off. Now, this costs money. NESO’s own figure for the current year for switching off wind power is 3.2 billion pounds. That is to switch off the wind power because the grid cannot handle what is being generated.

    NESO has the unenviable task of juggling intermittent generation from wind and solar with intermittent demand, which is a near impossible task, and which is why we need baseline gas and nuclear for backup. So to reiterate: we need more reservoirs, we need more flood defences, we need more nuclear, we need an upgrade to the National Grid, we need more gas storage.

    The proposition: net zero, refineries and the 1 per cent

    The question is not whether we should act. The question is whether the policies imposed in the name of climate action are effective, affordable and honest. Climate change is a scientific phenomenon. Net zero by 2050 is a political programme. Net zero has become a slogan where Britain needs a plan. Net zero allows politicians to announce a virtuous destination without explaining how we will reach it, what it will cost, who will pay for it, which industries will survive, or whether it will reduce global emissions at all.

    Now, what are the UK’s global emissions? Less than three quarters of 1 per cent of global carbon emissions: 0.74 per cent, which is less than Vietnam, Australia and South Africa, and on a par with Egypt. Is reducing it further going to affect the climate? Well, of course not. It’s too small, too little. In fact, it may cause more harm, and here is why.

    I will give you an example. Britain has lost two oil refineries in just over the last year, leaving four operating sites. Liquid fuels still provide 47 per cent of British energy consumption, and we have to import large amounts of diesel and jet fuel. These fuels are essential for road freight, agriculture, construction and aviation. Refineries are covered by the UK Emissions Trading Scheme. This places a financial penalty on emissions of carbon dioxide, creating an incentive to reduce pollution. But there are no more reductions that Britain’s refineries can make, which puts them at a disadvantage against countries that do not have carbon pricing regimes. It makes refining in Britain more expensive, and importing fuel from countries which do not impose carbon costs is cheaper.

    Closing a British refinery does not make UK demand for diesel or jet fuel disappear. It increases imports. The emissions are not eliminated. They are simply moved elsewhere. Total emissions rise, because somewhere else tends to have higher emissions, and there are further emissions from transporting the products to the UK. Emissions may be reduced in the UK, but global emissions rise. That is not decarbonisation; it’s economic vandalism.

    In the UK, net zero taxes, subsidies and system costs account for at least 40 per cent of electricity generating costs, about 22 billion pounds every year. The carbon tax alone adds roughly a third to wholesale electricity prices. Energy costs determine whether factories open or close, whether restaurants survive, whether families can afford to heat their homes. If our model creates the highest industrial electricity prices in the world, shuts factories and transfers production to countries burning more coal, nobody will follow us. Instead, other countries will take our jobs and grow their economies.

    Meanwhile, in Britain, more and more people are employed to inspect emissions, write climate compliance documents and distribute subsidies, and their salaries are ultimately funded by the workers and businesses being regulated out of existence. We need to stop trying to save the entire planet, and do practical things to help us adjust to climate change now.

    The opposition: the patient and the poison

    Good evening, everyone. I’m the speaker for the opposition. Imagine a patient diagnosed with a severe, fast-moving illness brought on by a chronic toxic habit. The doctor delivers a stark reality check: if the patient doesn’t stop consuming the toxin immediately, their vital organs will fail. In that critical moment, does the patient demand stronger painkillers and a more comfortable hospital bed, or do they immediately cut off the toxin to save their own life? Advocating for adaptation over mitigation is exactly like demanding a higher dose of painkillers while continuing to swallow the poison. It is a fatal distraction.

    Tonight, I will argue that climate mitigation, halting emissions at the source, is the only cure. Treating adaptation as an equal strategy is not pragmatism; it is palliative care for a planet we are fully capable of saving.

    Let’s look at the brutal, unvarnished facts. We are approaching irreversible tipping points. We have already locked in over 1.1 degrees Celsius of warming. Passing 1.5 degrees risks triggering the collapse of polar ice sheets and the Amazon rainforest, systems no amount of engineering can adapt to. The human cost is already catastrophic. Climate change causes over 150,000 deaths annually. If we do not mitigate, extreme heat and agricultural collapse will create over 1.2 billion climate refugees by the mid-century. Adaptation is a financial black hole. Unchecked emissions could cost the global economy 178 trillion US dollars over the next 50 years. No nation can afford to infinitely rebuild infrastructure destroyed by increasingly violent storms.

    The proposition will argue that the house is already on fire, and we must learn to live with the heat. They will tell you to build higher sea walls and engineered crops, or even gas storage or more power stations. I will outline four arguments as to why mitigation must be our focus. Firstly, I’ll explain that adaptation has hard limits. Secondly, that mitigation is possible. Thirdly, I’ll show you how mitigation makes adaptation cheaper and more effective. Finally, I’ll outline why mitigation does not require a drop in living standards. I don’t, however, argue that adaptation is not necessary. But our focus must remain on mitigation.

    The opposition: the hard limits of adaptation

    So first, on to adaptation and its hard limits. Climate change is a physical crisis. As global temperatures climb, a dangerous myth has taken hold: the illusion of infinite adaptation, the belief that human ingenuity, building sea walls and air conditioning, can engineer a warming world. But this argument ignores the laws of physics and biology. Whilst adaptation is a necessary tactical survival tool, it has absolute hard physical limits. If we do not use mitigation to halt warming, we will rapidly collide with physical thresholds no amount of money or technology can cross. To understand these hard boundaries, we must look at where adaptation physically breaks down.

    First, there are biological limits. Human physiology has an unyielding threshold: the wet-bulb temperature. When humidity and heat rise together past 35 degrees Celsius, the human body can no longer cool itself through sweat. It is a hard law of physics. No amount of adaptation can protect outdoor agricultural workers, or entire populations, when the ambient air itself becomes physically lethal.

    Second, there are structural and geological limits. Look at the recent catastrophic glacial collapse along the Nepal-Tibet border. Rising temperatures thawed the underlying permafrost, causing an entire glacier to collapse. It unleashed a 40-mile-an-hour wall of liquid concrete that obliterated downstream valleys. You cannot build a reinforced barrier to stop millions of tons of high-velocity debris.

    Third, there are ecological tipping points, which must be avoided to keep the air breathable, the water drinkable and the food systems operational. The UK government’s landmark report, Global Biodiversity Loss, Ecosystem Collapse and National Security, made it clear that ecosystems face hard thresholds. If temperatures force critical biomes like coral reefs or rainforests past their physical tipping points, they collapse immediately. You cannot adapt an agricultural system to grow crops if the fundamental global biosphere that regulates soil, water and pollinators has disintegrated.

    So mitigation is not about managing the symptoms; it is about respecting physical boundaries. Unlike adaptation, which tries to survive an increasingly broken planet, mitigation preserves the stable climate system that makes human biology and civilisation possible in the first place.

    The opposition: why climate change mitigation is possible, and cheaper

    On to argument two: why mitigation is possible. The argument between mitigation and adaptation is often framed as mitigation being impossible, both technologically and due to a lack of international cooperation. I will tackle both of these to demonstrate that mitigation is possible.

    Firstly, on science and technology. The adaptation argument can imply that meaningful mitigation is somehow beyond our technological capabilities. It isn’t. We know scientifically what needs to happen. Global greenhouse gas emissions need to fall sharply and ultimately reach net zero. We also increasingly have the technologies to do it. We can generate electricity from wind, solar and nuclear. We can electrify transport and heating. And these aren’t speculative technologies sitting in a laboratory. They are already being deployed at enormous scale. The challenge is primarily one of speed, investment, infrastructure and policy, not whether the underlying science is possible. There is also a powerful dynamic at work: technologies get better when we deploy them. Solar panels, batteries and electric vehicles have all become dramatically cheaper and more efficient as investment and deployment have scaled.

    The second strand focuses on global cooperation, which is required for mitigation to work. The proposition want you to buy into a dangerous myth. They want you to believe that international cooperation to mitigate climate change is an impossible dream. They argue that national self-interest will always block collective action. But this cynical view is flatly contradicted by history. In the 1980s, the Earth’s ozone layer was rapidly collapsing. The culprit was CFCs, and what did the world do? In 1987, every single nation on earth signed the Montreal Protocol. We banned the chemicals, we shared the technology, and today the ozone layer is actively healing. It is concrete proof that global environmental diplomacy works.

    In 2015, nearly every country in the world agreed to cooperate in the Paris Agreement framework. Prior to that, zero countries had formal net zero targets. Today, over 83 per cent of the global economy is covered by net zero pledges. Solar and wind installations have far outpaced forecasts made in 2015, with clean energy sources now generating over 40 per cent of global electricity. Cooperation is happening now through trade, economics and shared technology. The blueprint for global success exists. We’ve healed our atmosphere before, and we’re entirely capable of doing it again.

    On to the third argument: mitigation makes adaptation cheaper and more effective. When we discuss climate action, we often treat cutting emissions and building resilience as two separate, competing line items in a budget. The reality is that these two strategies are bound by a strict economic hierarchy. Mitigation is what makes adaptation affordable, effective and physically possible.

    Consider a practical example: flood defences. If global mitigation limits sea level rise to a moderate, predictable level, protecting a coastal city is a standard civil engineering project. But if we fail to mitigate, the engineering problem changes entirely. We transition from building slightly higher concrete walls to requiring massive, multi-billion-pound storm surge barriers. The UK government’s analysis on the economic opportunities of climate adaptation highlights this exact trap. It notes that climate damages could cost up to 8 per cent of UK GDP by the 2070s under current international climate policies. Globally, unmitigated climate change threatens to permanently dent global GDP. Unmitigated climate change will quickly outpace our financial capacity to adapt.

    So the choice isn’t between spending money on mitigation or spending money on adaptation. It is between paying a manageable cost now or paying an escalating and potentially unaffordable cost later. This is why mitigation isn’t a distraction from adaptation. It is the most important investment we can make to keep adaptation financially viable later.

    The opposition: living standards, and which comes first

    The fourth argument: mitigation does not require a drop in living standards. The belief that climate mitigation requires a lower standard of living is an outdated myth. Real-world economic data shows that we can successfully separate economic wealth from environmental damage through technology. There are three strands to this. First, absolute decoupling is real. Over 40 advanced nations have grown their economies by up to 66 per cent since 1990, while actively cutting their CO2 emissions by 30 to 50 per cent. This holds true even when factoring in the carbon from imported goods. Second, technology: global investment in renewables, grid storage and electric vehicles now reaches 2.2 trillion annually, exactly double the fossil fuel spending.

    And thirdly, the sacrifices are minority luxuries. True lifestyle friction is confined to non-essential habits of the wealthy elite. A mere 1 per cent of the global population causes 50 per cent of commercial aviation emissions. Swapping frequent flights for digital conferencing or zero-emission rail does not degrade human wellbeing. It simply rationalises luxury for a sustainable future.

    So to conclude, viewing this as a choice between adaptation and mitigation is false. We must do both. However, we must recognise their hierarchy. Adaptation is what we do to survive the damage that we’ve already locked in. Mitigation is what we do to ensure we still have a world left to adapt to. If we fail to mitigate, we will quickly reach a tipping point where adaptation becomes physically impossible. We cannot engineer our way out of an unliveable planet. Thank you.

    Roman vineyards and an oscillating climate

    Mr President, I would support most of what the proposer has proposed, but not actually for the reasons that he’s cited. It has been well established, I have mentioned it in these rooms, that it was hotter in Roman times than it is now. I won’t go into the vast details, but it has been done by tracking known Roman vineyards against modern vineyards. We know where modern vineyards are; you need archaeology to work out where the Romans had them. They were beyond Hull in Roman times. We are very far north. We should be a lot colder than we are now, but there you are. It got colder as we got to the mini ice age, which is around about the industrial revolution, and vineyards ended up on either side of the Thames estuary and no more. They’ve now got back, but not beyond Hull.

    So we’re going to expect to get warmer. Whatever you do with your climate business, the climate is changing, and it will get warmer anyway. So you’ve got to therefore mitigate the warming climate, and I’m going to suggest it’s a waste of time trying to end that trend to get warmer. If you put a wet towel around your head and put yourself in a darkened room and work out that it gets warmer as you go back beyond the ice age, all the arguments about climate change disappear.

    Now, another bit of evidence is that a few years ago New Scientist published, and they like to do things like this, they like to challenge established theories, which is unusual for publications, which usually stick to what people already think is happening. They published a chart showing 15 occasions when it was both warmer than it is now and colder than it is now, in what is called the warm interglacial period of the ice ages. We are in an ice age, and there’s a warm period. The ice age community said the ice is going to start coming out again, so it’s going to get colder. But I think that’s beyond any concept that we can put in our minds. I think the timescales are too long for that.

    But it certainly got colder as you went to the mini ice age, and warmer as you go back from the mini ice age to around zero AD. And New Scientist has published 15 occasions when it has been both warmer than it is now and colder than it is now. So I would say, by simple logic, ladies and gentlemen, that whatever happens it is going to go on getting warmer, and you’ve got to put up with it. You have to mitigate that it’s going to get warmer, regardless of what you’re going to do about it, which I don’t think is anything. We are in an oscillating climate anyway. Therefore, mitigation. That’s all you can do. You have a question?

    You said New Scientist found 15 occasions when it got warmer, and 15 occasions when it’s been colder. But you’re saying that it’s just going to get warmer. Why wouldn’t it get colder?

    Because we’re not up to the Roman level of heat here, so we are not up to the maximum. There have been 15 occasions when it has been warmer than it is now.

    But there are 15 occasions when it’s been colder.

    There are 15 occasions when it was colder, and the last time was the mini ice age, roughly between the late 1600s and the 1850s or 60s. That was the last ice age. The Thames in London froze over from about November to March, regularly, every year.

    I was a member of CND at a time when you could buy a “nuclear power, no thanks” badge in practically every language under the sun. I’ve since learned that probably whatever we use, there’ll be climate problems. There were people complaining about coal when that came out. Then we had the business about fracking. So whatever power we use, I think it’s probably like a cancer. It can be treated if it’s caught early, and I’m afraid it is not early. It’s probably too late now. We just have to adapt, and use as little power as we can. Thank you.

    Nepal, the global south and energy sovereignty

    Good evening, everyone. Happy summer. The Nepalese haven’t had such a great summer, have they? Did you see the pictures? Words or phrases have been used such as “we’ll have to just accept it, put up with it”, but we’re not suffering the consequences. It’s the global south. We’ve all seen the video footage. The UN said that in 2023 Nepal’s mountains had lost close to a third of their ice in just over 30 years due to global heating. So that’s visual imagery telling us of the catastrophe that awaits the global south, probably not the global north. We’ve got the finances to deal with it.

    I think the answer to the motion is probably both. It’s got to be both, right? But I don’t know what we can do about it. The UK is responsible for 1 per cent of emissions or something like that. The EU is 7 per cent, but the big ones are the US, India and China. If we want to do anything about it, how are we going to influence them? I’m reminded of 2000. George W. Bush won, and Al Gore lost. Al Gore, the big climate campaigner. How different the world might have been had he not accepted those chads. Do you remember the chad count?

    But the CFCs and the Montreal Protocol are a good example. Reagan, by the way, was president then. It’s a great example of how the world can get together. I think that, however, was also a last-minute thing. I’m not an expert, but I think it was.

    The big point really is energy sovereignty. We were relying on the Middle East, as the proposer said. Now we’re relying on Norway, and we’re also relying on the US. It’s getting ever more expensive, and so the real driver for energy sovereignty has got to be clean energy. Energy sovereignty is the big thing, right? And so that’s why we need to go towards clean energy, sun, wind, whatever, because it’s a losing battle if we keep importing.

    But it doesn’t look like that’s the direction we’re going, with Mr Donald J. Trump and this whole thing with Iran, trying to control the Strait of Hormuz: moves to try and control global energy supplies, to sustain hegemony and to try and control the development of other countries, especially China.

    Venezuela, right? Where now a non-compliant government has been replaced by a compliant government, and coerced, we learned this week, into giving away a third of Venezuela’s oil resources for the next 100 years, in a deal that’s very similar to the way the British coerced Hong Kong out of China. So it looks like the strategy of the powers that be is going to be all hydrocarbons. We’re going in the wrong direction. So, to sum up, my position is a bit of both, but we do need to focus on energy sovereignty and therefore clean energy. Otherwise, it’s a losing battle.

    Cumulative emissions and the duty to lead

    I want to be a bit provocative. Adaptation and mitigation are always a dichotomy to an extent; they always seem to collide with each other. Go back six years, to 2020. Governments were looking at net zero, at putting down some targets. Something else was happening back then, which was Covid. Back then, people were saying, “Look, we need to open right now. We should stop the lockdown, because otherwise the economy will just go bust. No one is going to make money. We need to go and do our own business, and whoever is there is going to suffer the consequences of us just opening up, and that’s fine. That’s life.”

    This is the same kind of discussion that is happening with climate change today: saying we just cannot solve the issue, we just need to let things go, whoever is going to survive is going to survive. This is the same kind of discussion that will also happen with AI at some point, when we are going to say, “Oh, it’s just AI. Things need to go the way they are supposed to go. It’s just the market.”

    In my opinion, when we come to whether we should do more adaptation or more mitigation: just last week, the UN published a report called Overshooting 1.5. The foreword of that report states that even though global warming is set to cross 1.5, likely within the next few years, the goal remains limiting the warming. However, the goal must now be approached from above, while the world adapts to intensifying climate impacts. Here is the important part: every fraction of a degree avoided, and every year by which overshoot is shortened, saves lives, protects ecosystems and reduces economic losses. Extreme weather events, glacier melt, ecosystem losses and sea level rise will only intensify above 1.5. Human health, food, water security, cities and infrastructure will come under increased strain.

    So when we’re talking about net zero, are we only talking about trying to reduce emissions, about the impact on the energy system? It’s more about how you can mitigate so that later you’re not going to pay higher prices, because there would be higher inflation. In my opinion, the risk from climate change is not really from flooding or from storms. The risk from climate change is actually that we are going to miss food security. Food security is going to be lacking, and there will be higher inflation. That’s where you will see the higher prices that we pay.

    There was a point made before about what we can actually do as a nation. The UK, yes, emits less than 1 per cent. Other European countries are the same, like my own country. But historically, the UK has been the one that started emitting the earliest. Climate change is a cumulative phenomenon. It’s not like today you emit 100, tomorrow you emit zero, and then you can start doing whatever you want. You need to look at climate change as cumulative emissions of CO2, and the UK has been one of the biggest contributors to those emissions. Not just the UK; also my own country.

    So how can we say to developing countries, to India, to Nigeria, to all these nations that are coming out of poverty, where each percentage point of GDP means people getting out of poverty: on what basis can we say, “Oh look, I’m not going to do anything because the UK is 1 per cent. What can the UK do?” It’s a global phenomenon. The nations that started emitting earlier should be the ones leading the global discussions. I’m done. Thank you.

    A tragedy of the commons

    So I’m actually split. I agree with the proposer in the short term, but with the opposer in the long term. That seems oxymoronic, but there we are. I think the first thing to get out of the way is that adaptation and mitigation assume that there’s one agent at play, and that’s not really true. The whole problem with climate change is that it’s really a tragedy of the commons.

    And with that, we can focus on a core issue for us, which is Britain’s competitiveness in things like industrial energy. We talk a lot about what Britain can be if we handicap ourselves in terms of energy cost, and we already really have. We are an example to the world of what not to do if you want to be competitive in industry. Our energy costs are triple what they are in the US. And in terms of actually being effective at producing energy, in the examples you gave, we sometimes have to rely on the French, which is never a good sign for anyone.

    Now, it is a fact that in the near term we are going to need gas, and I think if we are going to use gas, it should probably be our own. I understand that that seems to be moving backwards in a sense, but it’s not really. The idea that it’s moving backwards is really just an emotional lens on it. If gas is going to be used, it might as well be the stuff that we actually own.

    Regarding the CFC argument, I think it’s a bit flawed, because ultimately countries didn’t give up anything by giving up CFCs. It would be a very different bargain if you asked China to give up its use of coal. And so we have to be honest about what we could realistically ask countries to do, given the game theory of it.

    Beyond that, I think that we are absolutely unwilling to give up things about our lifestyle. Who is actually willing to not be able to buy fruit at certain times of the year? I’m not, right? And that fruit has to come from somewhere. It has to come on a big ship, run on fossil fuels, unless we bring back sails. And I think bringing up the statistics about how much Britain actually emits, 0.7 per cent or so, omits our complicity in the emissions generated elsewhere. There is clothing in this room created in the East, in factories consuming fossil fuels. We can’t discount all of the things that we import that used fossil fuels, of which there is a lot, and I think we would be surprised by how much we gain in our lifestyles through that.

    All that being said, we are going to use fossil fuels, and it is going to end badly if it continues ad infinitum. And so I think the more pragmatic way to think about it is: what can we do within the time between now and the end? I think Hinkley Point C is the ultimate testament to our failure, compared to something like China, which currently has in the works, I think, 36 nuclear power plants, all of prefabricated modular design, and we can’t even build one. What can we do with this time in which we have to use fossil fuels? That is my question, and I feel it answers the motion somewhat. That’s it.

    Fusion, and the power of example

    I really like the energy point that you made. I think nuclear fusion is something that hasn’t really been mentioned, that we can look into. For those who aren’t aware, it’s basically the opposite of fission. With fission, you get big atoms and you split them into smaller atoms, and it’s really easy to go wrong. You get nuclear bombs, and you get Fukushima or Chernobyl. Whereas fusion is really hard to do wrong, and it’s ridiculous in terms of how much energy you can make. For example, the amount of energy one human uses in their lifetime could come from fusion with maybe a bathtub of seawater and a laptop battery.

    One thing that’s quoted a lot with fusion is the joke that it’s always 30 years away. But right now there’s ITER in France, which is a running fusion reactor, and there’s one being built in the US which is not a scientific project; they’re doing it commercially, to power some of the AI things nearby. I think investing in fusion is somewhere, energy-wise, that we really need to look, because of the upsides. Ultimately, if we could get it working, it would be cheaper, and there’s greater potential because it doesn’t produce such bad by-products as some other sources of energy.

    I like the point made earlier about the UK doing stuff in the past, because I think it’s important to set a precedent. You might say that we only have 0.7 per cent of the world’s emissions, but if we were able to massively cut down on it, and maybe even get to net zero, then it would be hard for other countries’ governments, bigger governments, to say, “We can’t do it; it’s not viable,” because the UK was able to do it. I think the UK taking steps further would potentially create more of a global movement that would help us counteract climate change, as opposed to pretending that because we don’t do much now, there’s no point in dealing with it.

    I also think there’s the principle of climate change and global inequality, where the rich countries like China and the US use all the fossil fuels and produce all of this, and it’s the poorer countries that feel the negatives. I just think that’s unfair, and it sets a bad precedent globally, where the richer countries are able to exploit and do what they want, and they don’t feel the consequences of it. Only now, this summer, are we feeling the consequences, with the heatwaves and the hosepipe bans. Whereas Bhutan, which is near Nepal, is net zero, and Nepal’s having things like that happen. It’s not a local thing; it’s a global thing, and the UK taking steps towards that would be able to incite a global movement, in my opinion.

    Consumerism, local production and war

    I’m not used to speaking in public, so I apologise in advance. This is a debating society, I understand, so there needs to be a controversy. If we agreed on everything, then there would be no debate. But I think it’s already been mentioned by various people that it’s not either or; it’s both. We need to think about adaptation, and we need to think about mitigation. It’s more about the extent to which we focus on one or the other. I think the analogy of the patient is a good one. We have to think about the short term, but we have to address the root cause.

    It’s also been mentioned that, even though here in the West, let’s say the UK and Europe, we don’t produce as much of the emissions proportionally, we do a lot of the consumption that produces those emissions elsewhere. So I think we still have not only a moral responsibility but a practical one, and that has to do with the way we live: the system, the economic system. This is a consumerist society, based on people being made to feel that they have a need, and that they need to satisfy it by buying something. I think we are so immersed in that consumerist society that we just don’t realise it, and it seems normal, but maybe it’s not that normal.

    They tell us the fashion has changed, so we have to throw away clothes and buy new ones. Or my washing machine breaks down, and I have no clue what’s wrong, but all I know is that it’s cheaper to buy a new one than to have it looked at, and maybe it’s only one thing.

    Would you support the UK’s emissions going up by, say, 5 per cent because we did more manufacturing, if it meant global emissions reduced by, say, 10 per cent because we stopped importing from China and elsewhere? So the question is: would you increase local emissions to reduce emissions globally?

    To me, producing locally when it makes economic sense would be a good thing. I don’t understand how the UK exports beef and imports beef. Presumably the cows are the same. So there are things that could be produced locally. Maybe economically somebody would make more of a profit if it’s brought from the other side of the world. But even if it’s possibly a bit more expensive, it would make sense to produce locally in terms of security. You’re not dependent on another part of the world, and for emissions as well.

    And since CND was mentioned tonight, my humble proposition would be that one of the things that could be done to tackle global warming would be to stop wars, because I think that’s the most obvious one. Stop destroying things in order then to build things. I think that’s a real waste. So, thank you.

    Per capita emissions and British soft power

    I’ll try to keep this brief. I wanted to focus specifically on the argument that Britain accounts for just 1 per cent. Yes, in absolute numbers that’s true, but we need to look at per capita emissions between countries to understand their contribution. We often make fun of Taylor Swift for using private jets, and we criticise Leonardo DiCaprio for being a hypocrite. Why? Because one individual is producing many times the carbon dioxide emissions of other people.

    Second, there’s an underlying pessimism about Britain. The United Kingdom has always been a country that’s punched well above its weight. It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It is leading global debates on AI safety. It plays such an important role, and it can potentially play a much more important role in the single biggest crisis that humanity has probably faced.

    Building on this, I think there is a risk of retreating, and this is a thread I see in other debates, on other issues as well: this retreat into a little island mentality. We’re just this little island off the coast of Europe. We don’t matter. We don’t count. No, that’s simply not true. Its soft power is enormously high. People care about the royal family. They care about its actors. It has the capacity to influence the world in a positive direction.

    You also talked about the financial resources it possesses. When you have relatively novel technologies, it’s the wealthy countries that need to create a demand for them. That in turn incentivises R&D, and once those problems are figured out, we can move to mass production, bring down unit costs, and then the poorer countries can jump in. If you’ve read about this recently, Pakistan had a major electricity crisis, and it was often going to the IMF to get money to import fuel. It has pretty much cracked the problem. It just imported a bunch of cheap Chinese solar panels, and figured it out. So I think the UK has a very important role to play. That’s it.

    The cost of climate change mitigation, and the cost of inaction

    Thank you very much. First of all, a fact that needs to be cleared up: this idea that there was a period of human history which was hotter than today is categorically false. There may have been very select, specific parts of the world that were hotter, but as a whole, the statistics show that for the past 1,000 years there has never been a period hotter than today, and not just by a little bit, but by a huge margin. We are 1.4 degrees above the pre-industrial average. Even if you consider that the immediate pre-industrial period was in fact a mini ice age, the period before it, roughly before 1600, was only about 0.2 degrees hotter on average. So that’s the difference: 0.2 degrees hotter than the mini ice age, versus 1.4 degrees now, and a consistently rising trend.

    The proposer asked a number of questions about climate change mitigation, such as the cost, who is going to pay and which industries will survive. Thankfully, we have answers to all of that. In terms of cost, the Office for Budget Responsibility estimates that net zero will cost 1.4 trillion pounds over 30 years. That’s the gross cost. The net cost, because of all the efficiency gains that would be obtained from net zero, would be 344 billion pounds over 30 years, which seems like a pretty damn good bargain, especially when you consider there’s about 17.5 billion in indirect subsidies to the oil and gas industry.

    The cost of not doing anything is even more stratospheric. A study for the House of Lords estimated that climate change currently costs the UK economy 1.1 per cent of GDP. In 2050, that’s going to be 3.3 per cent of GDP, and by 2100 it’s going to be 7.4 per cent of GDP. These numbers come from Lord Stern, from the LSE’s climate change institute, or whatever it’s called. The OBR also said that inaction will mean UK debt reaching 290 per cent of GDP by the end of the century. So once we weigh the cost of doing net zero against the cost of not doing net zero, I think it’s pretty obvious that net zero is cost-effective.

    So who pays? Well, the state is obviously going to have to pay for a lot of this. Curiously, no one complains about who has to pay when the defence budget goes up. That means taxpayers. The private sector will also pay, except the private sector is going to benefit from a lot of these same efficiency gains, so in the end it might not even pay that much. Which industries will survive? Well, pretty much all of them, except if your industry is entirely based on polluting, and there aren’t that many. Even the oil and gas industry will survive under net zero. No one has said that it’s going to be the end of those industries. In a way, this is like the builders of horse carts complaining, when cars are invented, that their industry is not going to survive.

    Now, what about adaptation? Why is no one asking what the cost of adaptation is? The answer is because no one knows. The effects are absolutely unknown. Currently, the best estimate is that the global temperature is going to rise by 1.8 degrees. But that’s the most optimistic one. It could well be 2 degrees. It could well be 3 degrees, with absolutely catastrophic, if not borderline apocalyptic, effects. What about things like the collapse of the Atlantic current? What if we spend all this money to make Britain resilient to heat, and it turns into another Conan the Barbarian ice age? Well, actually, no, Conan was pretty hot. Or was it? Newfoundland.

    New Finland.

    Yes, it turns into New Finland. And guess who’s going to pay for all that? You all. Private companies are not going to give you a better price if all the effects of climate change happen. The state is still going to have to spend, and that comes from your taxpayer money, but you’re also going to spend as a consumer on adapting, because private companies will not bail you out of this one. Even with this optimistic 1.8 degrees, the idea is that if we do mitigation, that can be brought down to 1.5, which is better than nothing. It avoids perhaps some more catastrophic damage to the environment. So just remember: this year was the hottest year of your lives, but it’s going to be the coldest year for the rest of your lives.

    And I just want to reinforce one final point, which a number of people have made: the idea that the UK has to set an example for the rest of the world. I’m really surprised that a lot of people who are against net zero, who are the patriots and the nationalists here, suddenly think that when it comes to climate change, maybe the UK should just chill out and not be a leader, not punch above its weight. If you want leadership, this is the way to do it, because this is the emergency of our generation. Thank you.

    Living more local lives

    I’m in favour of the proposal, but I’ll stand here. Just really interesting points. On mitigation versus adaptation, I think we should definitely try and mitigate as much as we can. I simply don’t know enough to know how optimistic to be. I think our National Grid’s in a bit of a mess, it sounds like from the proposer. It’s not great that we’re telling solar companies to stop, and paying them 3 billion a year. I’m sure mitigation will work in the long run, but I think it’s so in the lap of the gods whether global governments are going to cooperate rather than work against each other. We can’t hope for that.

    And the reason I’m in favour of adaptation is, boy, we could do with some adaptation in Britain. We are so unadapted to climate change in the way that we live our lives. We are obsessed, and I’m getting this from, basically, I’m single, I’m on Hinge, I see the profiles. We are bloody obsessed with food and travel. Travel this, travel that, “give me tips for Bosnia”. We spend half our bloody lives on an easyJet, flying to places because it looks cool, and we need to stop. We need to live, truthfully, and this sounds miserable and tough, much more local lives. Maybe bring back the regional railways that were lost in the Beeching cuts, and encourage cheap travel to different parts of the UK. Stay local. Stop bloody travelling.

    The second thing we need to stop is food bloggery, food obsession. “I’m getting pomegranate on this,” and all that. Where does it come from? It’s so unsustainable. Buy local, basic food, and learn how to grow your own food. And the third, kind of frivolous one: we’re obsessed with wasting our time and our brain health on AI and on our phones, and this is basically fuelling the demand for the data centres. As I was discussing with the guy at the back, we need to start using old A to Z map books to get around London.

    It seems like we’re doing the complete opposite of that, with frivolous use of AI on a personal level and at work. At work it seems to be encouraged. I’m constantly encouraged to use Claude to translate a wordy email into three sentences of bullet points, and then someone makes three sentences of bullet points into a really wordy email and sends it back. It’s a kind of AI bullshit going on here, and it’s data centres, data centres, data centres. Water. And it’s fuelled by our demand. So, on an individual and community level, we need to re-evaluate how climate-friendly our lives are, and how we can live more climate-friendly lives without being miserable.

    And how can we all do that by ourselves? Can we do that through social change? The sad thing is, I’m afraid we’re going to have to do what we do with cars and just price people off the roads. We’re going to have to price people out of AI. We’re going to have to price people out of wanky food and prep. We’re going to have to price people out of cheap flights to Malaga. Sorry, unless I go off and think of a better, fairer adaptation strategy. But I do think we’re dreadfully badly unadapted. We are like Germans in 1910, with no idea of the kind of turbulence that’s coming, sitting and enjoying Mozart. I’m done.

    Public goods, private goods and Indonesian nickel

    I’m standing in the wrong place, but it’s just for convenience. I don’t know how to solve this problem. I think you can take two different lenses to it. If you take an international lens and you think we’re all going to cooperate, then yes, mitigation is the way to go. But mitigation is a public good. If we, as the UK, only emit 1 per cent of global emissions, but we spend a billion on mitigation, are we only getting 1 per cent of that benefit back for our spend? Some have pitched that we should take a leadership position, that there’s some sort of multiplier effect that will lead other actors in the world to follow our endearing example of how to mitigate climate change. I’m not so sure I buy that.

    If you take adaptation, that’s a private good. If we put air conditioners in our houses, we will feel that benefit ourselves. Some will say, okay, but it’s all about climate change; it’s about reducing energy consumption. I’m not so sure that’s the right way to think about it. I think there is a world in which we’ve got clean and abundant energy, and we need to move away from where that comes from currently. Right now, the Far East, China, produces the majority of solar panels. That’s where the manufacture of solar panels is. So how can we be arguing that we should be using all of that technology here when they’re controlling it and taking all the benefit there? Should we be trying to create that sort of industry here? Is that how we get away from the mitigation problem?

    Another problem of international coherence: when we look at this debate on climate change, I think we focus on CO2 as the only thing we emit that’s unwanted in the world. When you look at what else is emitted, you’ll see that the players that emit a lot of CO2 are not playing with the same mentality that the West would. I’ll give you one anecdotal example from a different industry: nickel.

    You get two types of nickel deposit in the world: nickel sulphides and nickel laterites. The sulphide deposits, we in the West have extracted all of ours. We know exactly how to do that. The laterites are based in Indonesia, and the Chinese cracked the code on how to process them. They use a high-pressure acid leach process, which means they’re adding a lot of acid to that ore body, and what do they do with the acid? They just pump it into the ocean.

    So the reality is the Chinese are willing to drop the price of nickel to the point that they benefit from it, and the rest of the world is going to suffer because they’re polluting a global ocean. So you’re going to stand here and say that we should be mitigating as the UK, when we know that the Chinese are just going to emit? What are we really doing? We’re just displacing that emission from here to there. Does that really assuage your moral obligation? Should we not be spending on adaptation, which is where we’re going to feel the benefits here as the UK?

    If you take that lens of the globe versus us as an individual country, I think you end up in two very different places, which makes it quite a difficult problem, because there is no solution now. How do you convince every player to operate in a cooperative manner towards the same end, when they clearly are not interested in the same end? Some people want to grow the economy. We might not want to grow our economy, when you look at how we tax ourselves and all the other policies we put in place as a government. So it’s a bit of a mixed bag. Which way do you go? Which is the right solution to the actual problem? I think we all agree we would like to live in a beautiful climate. How do we actually get ourselves to that point?

    It’s really difficult to convince the global body that is all of the nations to act in a coherent manner. I think it’s the US that didn’t meet its climate accords, right? They signed up to it and then walked away, and never did anything about it. So they convince people to go, and then they go back and play for their own best interest. How does the UK sit in that space and do the right thing? I’m not so sure about putting the burden on UK taxpayers to try and move the needle on global emissions when others don’t do anything. I don’t think that’s the right way for us as an island.

    And another anecdotal thought: if you look at CO2 emissions specifically, how much is emitted from volcanoes? We’ve seen this massive volcano that’s erupted out in Indonesia. How much is that going to emit over the next couple of weeks and months? Is that going to wipe out two or three years of our sacrifice? Is that really a sacrifice you want to make?

    Volcanic ash, climate change mitigation and who pays for adaptation

    Are you aware that volcanic dust also reflects sunlight back out and can cool the planet?

    Well, I thought CO2 was the problem.

    But it counterbalances it.

    Does it?

    It does, temporarily.

    So should we then put more volcanic ash into the atmosphere?

    Yes.

    I’m sure the Indonesians and all their cancelled flights are going to absolutely love that solution. Again, you’re outsourcing the cost to a specific, localised part of the world, which I’m not sure is the coherent solution to a global problem. You have to win that collaboration, and get all the nations to buy into the same vision.

    Who is going to pay for the adaptation costs of poor countries? Do they have to pay for it themselves, even though they’re not responsible for the majority of emissions?

    Well, if they’re the ones that are going to get impacted, should they not solve their own problem? I would love for you to have this argument with the Chinese, who are the main cause of this problem right now. So good luck convincing them to go and fund the poorer nations.

    The US has been, cumulatively, the country that is…

    Again, good luck convincing them. Good luck. I support you. Go and have that argument with the US.

    Now you’re switching your own answer. Who will pay for the adaptation costs of poor countries?

    They’ll have to pay for it themselves.

    To say nothing else of what is practical, or what has to be: do you think what you said just there, that they should have to pay for it, is flatly fair? Like a mother explaining ethics to a child: do you think that is fair?

    Who said the world was fair?

    I’m just being blunt.

    Who said the world is fair? No, no, I agree with you. It’s probably not fair if they are the victim of some mega trade around the globe, but the reality is, if your country is flooding, you should build a wall.

    I don’t care about the reality. I have no interest in the rest of this question. My question relates only to this: do you think it’s fair?

    Well, the answer is obviously it’s not fair.

    What do you think adaptation for the UK would be like, then? Say the UK does nothing. No one does anything. Everyone is on their own. What does adaptation look like for the UK?

    It means surviving, right? What do you want it to mean?

    What do I want it to mean?

    What do you think adaptation means? No one’s stood up here and said exactly what adaptation looks like at this point in time.

    Poverty before climate policy

    Okay, so now I think we get to the crux of the matter, because we can all worry about what little old England is going to do about it, but really, what we do is going to be negligible. We have a much, much bigger problem. We are in a climate crisis; we all agree with that. Everything that everybody has said this evening, I totally agree with. But the UK isn’t going to solve it. China isn’t going to solve it. India isn’t going to solve it.

    Now, we have a bunch of countries with very, very poor people. Over 50 per cent of the population of the world survives on just over $8 a day. They’re not worried about adapting to climate change; they’re not worried about mitigating climate change. They are worried about basic survival. We are in a very fortunate position. We live in one of the largest, most comfortable societies that there is, regardless of what you read or see on the news every day. But if you are a politician working for a government in one of those very poor countries, you might pay some lip service to environmental issues, but you’re fundamentally worried about trying to improve the lives of those people.

    They’re not going to be sitting there thinking, “Shit, the Brits are doing their little bit of net zero. That’s great. Why aren’t we doing our bit?” They’re worried about improving the quality of their lives, because they think, why can’t I have what the Brits have got? Who would disagree with that? Would you disagree with that? No, you wouldn’t.

    I tell you what: we will all leave here this evening, we’ll get on some big jumbo jet, and we’ll go off to some third world country. We’ll get a lovely little luxury coach into some field somewhere, and we’ll say to some guy, “Listen, what do you think about environmental change and the impact of fossil fuels?” And they’ll flip you the bird. That’s what I think they’ll do. They’ll say, “I want my life to be improved.” And the politicians sitting in third world countries are saying, “Our priority isn’t environmental change.” It’s a luxury for us to be sitting here talking about environmental impacts. People are dying of poverty, and we sit here talking about adapting to climate change, about mitigating climate change. We are pathetic. Thank you.

    Local adaptation, and a debt owed

    Okay. Thank you very much for having me tonight, gentlemen. Some very interesting points all over. I do very strongly agree with the previous speaker: we are very pathetic, and we’re in a very privileged position to be talking about what we can do, and even to have the emotional and mental space to consider this as something that we need to work on. I think realistically, overall, it has to be a bit of both, like we’ve said: mitigation on a large scale, but local adaptation is also very important, because I really do think that we’re not mentally or spiritually prepared for how bad it’s actually going to get.

    Realistically, even if the whole world stopped all of its polluting today, we’d still have decades’ worth of greenhouse gases and environmental impact to work off to get back to a healthy climate. But I do think that the West owes it to the developing world. The reason that we’re even here today, as we are, this country and America as well, is the exploitation of the world, and that’s being pushed off onto other countries, directly through polluting and sending all of our rubbish to Malaysia, or, like what’s happening in Nepal, as an indirect impact of our actions.

    As was said earlier, this is going to be the coldest year we’ve ever experienced, and the year with the most water in our reservoirs, and the year with the most food yields from our crops. So we’re going to have to think of something. We’ve known about the impacts of greenhouse gases on the environment for 120 or 130 years; the first paper about it was 130 years ago, and we’ve spent all this time and all this money to hide it and keep it a secret. So I don’t have much hope, unfortunately, that we’re going to do any meaningful mitigation.

    So I think it is going to have to be local adaptation, where we have smaller communities who are able to help each other and give each other food and whatever we need. Because, yes, it’s going to get bleak, guys. I know we said no travelling, but if you do want to see Venice before it sinks, you’re going to have to get there quickly. So, yes, thank you very much, guys.

    Closing for the opposition: gas prices, imports and energy sovereignty

    We’ve talked quite a bit tonight about energy, in particular its cost and our reliance on it, and where it comes from. The UK has energy prices which are viewed as uncompetitive, primarily because we rely on gas. The UK sets the price according to the gas price, and that happens 98 per cent of the time in the UK, whereas in France it’s 7 per cent and in Germany it’s 24 per cent. So we need to continue using renewable sources, and think about how we structure the mechanisms to make sure that energy is priced affordably for everyone, so that we can transmit those benefits throughout the country.

    Only 42 per cent of the wholesale energy cost comes from the actual energy itself. The rest comes from transmission, from taxes and those sorts of things. So linking high energy prices to renewables is false. Furthermore, in February 2026 the price of renewables was much lower than gas. We had solar at 65 pounds a megawatt, wind at 72 pounds, and gas at 89 to 100 pounds per megawatt. So it’s clear to me that energy from renewable sources is the cheaper alternative in this day and age.

    Then, talking about reliance: the proposition spoke about how we import electricity from France from time to time. In actual fact, we import electricity from France only 12 to 16 per cent of the time. It’s very common practice, and it happens every single day of the year. Meanwhile, we import 43 per cent of our fossil fuels, and we’re relying on the global price and the shocks that come with that. So I think renewables are a vote for energy sovereignty in the UK, so that we can take control of our energy and reduce the prices for everyone.

    I agree with the speaker back there that we are pathetic, but not for the reasons he said. We can’t stop flying around the world for our holidays. We can’t stop living our carefree lives and focus on policies which actually make a difference and drive forward change. We are starting to see some of those policies. The UK will be introducing a carbon price similar to the EU’s carbon border mechanism. That will mean that goods sold in the UK have a price attached to them to reflect the carbon that other countries have emitted in producing them. That will make those goods less competitive, and make goods made with renewable sources more competitive, and in that way we will encourage other countries to move along their own renewable transition.

    One of the speakers spoke about their washing machine, and it being cheaper to replace it than to repair it. In the EU they have a right to repair act, so now all new appliances have to be repairable. They can no longer be built in such a way that you cannot repair them. So in that way, we’re starting to build policies which bring forward change. So I ask everyone to stop sticking our heads in the sand, act now to mitigate and look towards the future.

    Closing for the proposition: Britain’s perspective, and Britain’s weakness

    Well, Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, a lot of this discussion has been about mitigation from the point of view of countries cooperating, and from a global perspective. I deliberately, when I started my speech, focused on the UK, because that is the perspective that we, as an audience here, have. We are in the UK. We know about the UK, so I concentrated on the UK as a common perspective. We don’t know about the problems that other countries have. We don’t know what their priorities are, what their problems might be. So it’s highly presumptuous of us to talk about other countries and what they might or might not do.

    Cooperation, for example. India has a very different economy to ours. India consumes a million tons of coal a day, and its carbon emissions have gone up 8 per cent. Now, they’re not going to take any notice of us if we say, “Well, that’s actually not a very good thing, to consume that much coal.” Why would they? China: 49.7 per cent of its energy has come from coal in the last year. They’re making great strides with renewables and what have you, but China is not going to listen to us if we say, “Well, actually, you shouldn’t be mining coal; you shouldn’t be opening a new coal-fired power station every two weeks.” Why should they? So, frankly, to argue that we should be setting an example and other countries are going to follow it is just hogwash. It’s nonsense.

    We are making ourselves weaker by all the taxes that we impose on our energy generation, and the industries that are going to the wall. We are ultimately making ourselves more dependent on imports, and weaker, because we produce less here domestically. And frankly, the more stuff that comes by sea into our ports, the more vulnerable we are, and the weaker as a country we are. So to argue that it’s a virtue is nonsense.

    Up to now, we have concentrated on reducing carbon emissions. We have neglected and ignored adaptation: flood defences, more reservoirs, nuclear power, things that would actually help us. That’s become the poor relation, and it’s about time that we stopped thinking about saving the world and reducing our carbon footprint even further, and concentrated on what is going to help us in future.

    Closing for the proposition: subsidies, pipelines and fairness

    My friend over there quotes figures from the OBR and the LSE. Well, I’m not surprised; economists always get it wrong, and frankly the OBR and the LSE are just about the least reliable sources of information and figures you could possibly imagine. They’re always getting it wrong. And my friend over there mentioned nuclear fusion. Yes, but it’s still at the experimental stage. There is a reactor in France. There is one in the USA. If they can get it going commercially, wonderful. But it’s still very experimental. It’ll take years to come to fruition, and I’m more concerned about what is happening today.

    The opposer talks about energy, and says that wind and solar are much cheaper, and it’s all set by the gas price. No, it isn’t, because the subsidies that go into wind and solar are enormous. To set up a wind farm, the initial costs are huge, absolutely enormous, and the companies that do that want a guaranteed price that will allow them to recoup their investment and make a profit over 15 to 20 years. The subsidies that are hidden inside the prices are enormous for both wind and solar, and that is what he is deliberately ignoring.

    Yes, there is an international gas price. If we were to stop taxing our own oil and gas industries to death and actually use our own fields in the North Sea, it wouldn’t make a difference to the overall price, that is true, but it would provide jobs, which would pay taxes, and it would make us more self-sufficient and less dependent on getting it from countries like Norway.

    And incidentally, Norway supplies us by a pipeline under the sea, which could easily be disrupted at any time by an unfriendly power, just as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from Russia to Poland was disrupted not that long ago. Quite easy to do, and that would put us into dire straits, because it would cut off our source from Norway. That sort of thing makes us weaker. We should be concentrating on our own resources and beefing them up, instead of taxing them to death.

    And a friend over here talked about fairness. There was this question that came up about poorer countries, and who should pay for adaptation for them. This strange idea about fairness: life is not fair. Fairness is a concept that we have invented. When we feel that life is not very favourable for us, we say, “Oh, it’s not fair.” Frankly, fairness doesn’t exist in life. I can tell you that from personal experience. Fairness is simply an idea that we have conjured up from somewhere. It’s completely irrelevant to this sort of discussion.

    So, thank you, Mr Chairman. We need to concentrate on this country and our own adaptation to climate change, because whether we like it or not, climate change is here now, and we have to cope with it. All these things that we’ve done to try to mitigate it, and all the conferences and everything, haven’t stopped it. It’s still coming, and we just have to adapt to it, whether we like it or not.

    The vote on climate change mitigation

    We have to see which way the house is standing tonight. So let me reread the motion: climate policy should now focus on adaptation, not mitigation. All those in favour, please raise your hand. All those opposed. You can abstain. And abstentions. Right. So we have had a shift, and it’s an extremely close vote: by a razor-thin margin, seven in favour, eight against, five abstentions. The motion has not carried.

    Further reading

    Download this debate as a PDF: Sylvan detailed summary, climate change mitigation debate, September 2026. Browse our archive of past Sylvan debates, or read how Sylvan debates work. Related: the growth and climate change debate, the debate on affording net zero and the British state and growth debate.

  • British state and growth: what is holding Britain back?

    British state and growth: what is holding Britain back?

    Motion in the British state and growth debate: the British state impedes economic growth

    Debated: 15 June 2026, Ye Olde Cock Tavern, Fleet Street

    Format: rapid debate, proposer and opposer, floor speeches

    The evening’s first motion put the British state and growth in the dock together: the British state impedes economic growth. A show of hands before the speeches gave the proposition 12 votes to 3, with one abstention. The interest was not the result but the range of incompatible reasons found for it.

    The proposer on the British state and growth: what the state fails to do

    An unusual case from an unusual proposer

    The proposer opened by naming the oddity of their own position: a leftist who believes the state should be active in economic development, arguing that this one impedes growth. Then came an offer. If you think taxes are too high, vote for the motion, though Britain’s burden sits below the OECD average. If you think regulation stifles enterprise, vote for the motion, though on the anniversary of Grenfell it is worth saying Britain is among the least regulated countries in several industries.

    The British state and growth: housing first

    Their own case was about what the state does not do, and housing came first. In the mid-1990s the average London home cost roughly four times the average annual wage. By just after the pandemic that figure had reached nine, and they assumed it is higher now.

    Productivity has been flat since the financial crisis, they argued, partly through overdependence on finance and partly through housing. Money paid to a landlord is money not spent elsewhere. Cities generate productivity, and people priced out of them cannot contribute to it.

    Ten per cent of new homes

    The claim they treated as decisive concerned who buys new housing. Only about 10 per cent of new British homes reach the open market, they said, and in London about 2 per cent. The rest go to institutional investors and overseas buyers. Sales could be restricted to owner-occupiers, and are not.

    What Italy does that Britain does not

    Infrastructure closed the speech. Rail costs three or four times as much per kilometre here as in Italy, they claimed, and Italy has a national engineering agency that standardises the work whenever a city needs a metro. Britain starts each scheme from nothing and buys in the expertise.

    The opposer on the British state and growth: a global system

    Everybody has this problem

    The opposer’s case was comparative. Every country wants growth and few are getting much: Europe is not growing, the United States less than the headlines suggest, and China is the outlier. On which government was meant, they took both. The Conservative answer was austerity, which cut costs and investment together, and many economists date the weakness to the absence of investment after 2008.

    Capital moves and ownership follows

    Their central argument was the free movement of capital. It buys the housing stock and it buys the businesses. Numbers of British firms are owned by American private equity, and when a British company approaches viability, global capital arrives and takes it. What results is shareholder capitalism rather than stakeholder capitalism, with the shareholders abroad.

    Their remedy looked like the proposer’s: restrictions on who may buy British companies and housing, since the Americans would never let a foreign buyer take a firm they considered a national interest.

    The wounds that were self-inflicted

    Two concessions closed the speech. Britain has damaged itself, and the 2016 vote to leave the European Union did more of that damage than 2008 did. The country also depends on the United States for energy, defence and finance, so every card transaction runs through an American system. Any government would meet the same constraints.

    Voices from the floor on the British state and growth

    The entrepreneur’s warning

    The first floor speaker had advice for anyone starting a business: do not do it in the formal economy. The state tells you what to pay people and takes a share of it, and small firms can afford neither accountants nor the time to contest a bad assessment. They believe the country is in a depression deeper than that of the 1930s, and that the last one ended in a war they cannot see coming.

    The arithmetic of borrowing and net zero

    A second speaker read out numbers. Employers’ national insurance and the minimum wage both rose, so hiring costs more and over a million young people are out of work. Borrowing heads towards £3 trillion at 4.7 per cent, the highest rate in the G7, and this year’s interest bill of £111.2 billion is 8.3 per cent of all public spending. Against a welfare bill of £345 billion they set £42 billion of net zero commitments, and called it a failure of priorities.

    Whether growth is the point

    One speaker questioned the premise. Growth may not be what life is for, and spending on climate now may save money later. A younger generation declining to work until ten at night is choosing a better life rather than failing at the old one. An ageing population presses on the health service, and artificial intelligence is removing the entry-level jobs the young once started in.

    Energy, ownership and borders

    Another speaker took three positions at once. Britain should use the North Sea, since restricting supply raises the cost of everything that moves. Railways and utilities should return to public ownership, because private priorities are profit rather than service. And open borders are not a left-wing policy: they hold wages down and press on housing.

    The net zero exchange

    That drew the sharpest exchange of the night. A speaker who works in energy countered that net zero lowers prices, citing hours of free and negative-priced power in Spain and an Italian supplier giving electricity away between noon and four. A speaker working in oil and gas replied that the British version includes an end to North Sea exploration licences, and asked whether that had no effect. The first held their ground: demand does not require those reserves.

    The British state and growth: the cost of complying

    A further speaker put a figure on regulation from the other side. The state makes decisions and outsources the cost of implementing them. Brexit has probably cost between 2.5 and 4 per cent of GDP, they said, and compliance between 4 and 6 per cent. The tax authority closed its helplines for months, and Britain has the most expensive electricity in the G20, an awkward foundation for an economy said to be saved by artificial intelligence.

    A dissent on growth itself

    One contributor dismissed the frame. Economics is a work of fiction, they said, and there had been enough hot air in the room to heat several houses. Growth has limits on a planet with finite resources, and the distribution of wealth is a world government question.

    They also corrected the unemployment figure. The population aged 16 to 24 is 6.9 million, so a million out of work is a minority, and many of the rest work in charity shops and cafés.

    The household and the Ritz

    Another speaker reached for the family budget. Essentials first, then whatever is left, and they had never chosen a fortnight at the Ritz because they could not afford it. The country has been doing the equivalent for years, and income tax now covers little more than the welfare bill. Asked to accept that 70 per cent of that bill is pensions, they did, and named the triple lock as part of what everybody will have to pull back on.

    The case for doing less

    A speaker almost won over by the proposer’s argument that the state should do more said the opposite: it should do far less. Policy here is built on ideology rather than economics, and stamp duty slows movement into housing. Rather than tackle the debt the state will inflate it away, and top marginal rates, council tax and licence fees remove the money that would otherwise reach producers as demand.

    Tuvalu and Papua New Guinea

    The most direct challenge came late. One speaker took the motion to be about the existence of a state rather than the conduct of this one, and cited the literature holding that institutions drive long-run growth: rule of law, property rights, elections, and a government able to enforce them.

    Then they set two Pacific countries against each other. Tuvalu has 10,000 people, a highest point five metres above sea level and no resources. Papua New Guinea has 11 million people, oil, gas, fisheries and vast neighbours. Tuvalu has the higher income per head, and the difference is a credible government.

    The state is more than the government

    The club’s president took that up. There had been complaint about both recent governments, but the motion says the state, and the courts are the state too. A business dispute here can be settled at law in a semi-reasonable time, which is a condition of doing business at all. They quoted Hobbes on life without government being solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short, and drew a line at solar generation in a country where it rains while defending wind in Scotland.

    The British state and growth: how far should the state reach

    The last floor speaker reframed the question as one of degree. South Korea took the other path, betting on a few industries and letting them run, and China is copying it. What results is a handful of families with enough economic weight to hold political sway. At issue is not whether a state should exist but how far into the economy it should reach.

    Closing arguments: the opposer on the British state and growth

    The opposer replied first and led with comparison. Japan carries debt worth 230 per cent of its output, the United States 120 per cent, and France and Canada more than Britain does. On foreign direct investment, offered as the world’s verdict on an economy, Britain remains a focal point.

    History did some work too. British growth was built on empire, on raw materials taken cheaply and goods sold back, and competing fairly is harder. Austerity cut the debt and killed the investment. Our labour market is more flexible than Europe’s, and taxation funds the roads and the legal system without which no business could trade.

    Closing arguments: the proposer on the British state and growth

    The proposer went straight at the opposition’s central claim. Dependency on global capital is not weather. It is the residue of decisions taken under Thatcher, under Blair and under every government since, to run down industry and build on finance. France, Germany and Sweden made different choices, and Poland is the fastest-growing economy in Europe while being just as integrated.

    On the distinction between state and government they conceded the point and turned it: governments make the choices that shape the state, and this one has a large majority and has used it cautiously. Britain has the worst insulated homes in Europe, housing starts have fallen since the pandemic, and management fees can be raised from £2,000 to £6,000 at will. All of it could be legislated against.

    Their close was an invitation. Whether you think the state does too much or too little, the motion holds, because the question is not what the state could do but what it has done.

    The final vote on the British state and growth

    The room voted 13 in favour, 4 against and 2 abstentions, and the motion was carried. Before the speeches the show of hands had been 12, 3 and 1, so every column grew by one and the balance held almost exactly.

    The chair noted that the counts did not quite reconcile, most likely because latecomers were present for the second. What the evening produced was not a shift but broad agreement reached from irreconcilable directions.

    Why the room linked the British state and growth

    The motion was carried 13 to 4, and it was always going to be. Four to one before a word was spoken is not a debate to be won so much as a majority to be kept, and the more useful question is why a room this varied agreed so readily. The answer is that the motion is broad enough to hold two opposite complaints, and the proposer spotted that in his first minute.

    The proposition’s case: housing, productivity, procurement

    The opening speech did something unusual and effective. It began by handing the audience arguments the speaker did not believe, on tax and on regulation, and inviting them to vote on those instead. That converts every free-market objection in the room into a vote for the motion while conceding nothing.

    The case they did make was about omission rather than interference: housing left to institutional buyers, productivity flat since the crisis, infrastructure bought from consultancies rather than built by a standing public capability. Framing the charge as a failure to act made it hard to answer, because the opposition’s best material was all about what the state cannot control.

    It was also the only speech of the night that treated the British state and growth as a question of capability rather than of attitude. The Italian engineering agency is a small, concrete example of a thing a state can build and Britain has not, and nobody from the floor engaged with it.

    The opposition’s case: capital, dependency, comparison

    The opposition’s argument was the more sophisticated of the two and it was structurally doomed. Their claim was that global capital flows explain what looks like British failure, and that any government would meet the same forces.

    Two problems followed. Conceding that the remedy is restriction on foreign purchases of housing and firms hands the proposition its case, since a state that could restrict and does not is a state that impedes by omission. And the comparative material, that Japan and France carry more debt and that Britain still attracts investment, argues only that Britain is not unusually bad. The motion never said unusually.

    What the opposition needed, and never quite reached, was the claim that the state is not the binding constraint. They gestured at it with the point about global capital, then undercut it by naming Brexit, which is a decision of the British state, as the deeper wound.

    The ebb and flow of the floor debate

    Twelve floor speakers followed, and they agreed on the verdict while disagreeing about almost everything else. Three battlegrounds opened, and none of them was about the motion. Housing surfaced in five separate contributions, which is a continuation of the evening the club spent on whether an obsession with home ownership leads to poor decisions, and the party-political material picked up where the Greens and Reform debate left off.

    First battleground: energy and the price of net zero

    The one genuine exchange of the evening was about energy. Two speakers argued that net zero raises costs and that the end of North Sea exploration is an economic decision dressed as an environmental one. Two others, both of whom work in the sector, argued the opposite from operating experience, citing negative wholesale prices in Spain and suppliers giving power away in the middle of the day.

    That is the argument this room does well: specific, drawn from work rather than from newspapers, and conducted between people who disagreed without either retreating. It changed no votes, because both sides of it were compatible with the motion. A state that spends £42 billion on the wrong things impedes growth, and so does a state that ends exploration licences without replacing the supply, and so does a state that fails to build the cheap generation its neighbours have. Every version of the energy argument was a version of the motion.

    Second battleground: what the state costs to comply with

    The most original contribution of the night put a figure on something usually left vague. Compliance may cost British businesses more than leaving the European Union did, on the argument that the state sets rules and outsources the cost of obeying them, and that the growth in employment is in the departments that do the obeying.

    It is a contested figure and it went unchallenged, which is worth recording. It also cut across the proposition’s own case, since that speaker wanted less state where the proposer wanted more, and both were voting the same way.

    Third battleground: problem or precondition

    The only line of attack that could have moved the vote arrived from the floor, late, and from an unexpected direction: that the question is whether a state helps or hinders in general, answered by the institutions literature and by two Pacific countries with opposite endowments and opposite results.

    The president reinforced it from the other side, pointing out that the courts, the rule of law and the roads are the state, and that Britain without them would have no economy to slow down. Both speeches were well received and neither dented the result, for a simple reason. The motion does not say the British state prevents growth. It says it impedes growth, and a state can be necessary and obstructive at once.

    The argument nobody made

    Worth recording is what went missing. Nobody defended the state’s record on its own terms, and nobody argued that current policy is working. Even the opposition’s case was that the failure is not Britain’s fault rather than that there is no failure.

    Nor did anyone test the proposer’s central statistic, that only a tenth of new British homes reach the open market. It is a striking figure, it did most of the work in the opening speech, and it passed without a question in a room containing an accountant, two energy professionals and an economist. A motion phrased as blame carries a room that agrees about the diagnosis, and agreement of that kind discourages the checking that a contested claim would attract.

    What drove the result in the British state and growth debate

    The pre-vote did most of the work, and honesty requires saying so. A room that starts 12 to 3 has decided, and the speeches were arguing about reasons rather than about the verdict. Only one column moved by more than a single vote, and the room was larger at the close than at the opening, so even that movement is more plausibly a matter of arrivals than of persuasion.

    What the evening added was range. A self-described leftist proposing, a speaker who wants the railways nationalised, a speaker who wants austerity deepened, a speaker who doubts growth is worth pursuing, and a speaker who thinks the state is the reason there is anything to measure: all but the last voted the same way. The motion is broad enough that doing too much and doing too little both count as agreement, and the proposer’s closing said so out loud rather than hiding it.

    Conclusion

    The most striking thing about the evening was not the margin. It was the president’s observation that a motion about the economy would not have reached a Sylvans agenda a few years ago, which says more about the mood of the room than the vote does. A club that cannot agree on what the state should be doing can still agree, and did, that it is not doing it.

    Full transcript of the British state and growth debate

    Read the full transcript

    The motion and the opening show of hands

    The chair read the motion: the British state impedes economic growth. Plenty to say here, for and against. Could it be the current government? Could it be elements of the British state, the deep state, as they say on X? Is it even the responsibility of the state to engender economic growth, if it is not impeding it? But it is not my opinion and pontifications that count.

    The chair then asked the room for an opening position. Twelve declared for the motion, three against, and one abstained.

    The opening speech: the British state and growth

    My fellow Sylvans, those of you who know me might be shocked that I am arguing for a proposal against the British state, or any state in general. After all, I am a dirty leftist. I should be in favour of the state being active in economic development, and the truth is, I am.

    I am not here to convince the people who might argue, and I am sure we will hear this from the floor speakers, that for example taxes are too high, even though actually Britain has a slightly lower tax burden than the average OECD country. But it is fine with me if you believe that, as long as you vote for the motion.

    You might also think Britain has too many regulations that stifle business and stifle the market. Well, now that we are on the anniversary of Grenfell, that probably would not have happened in most European countries, because they have better regulation on certain things, and in fact, in many industries, Britain is well known for being one of the least regulated countries. But it is fine with me if you believe that regulation is too stifling for private enterprise. Vote for the motion.

    I am going to tell you what the British state also does to stifle growth, or rather what it does not do that stifles growth, and you would be shocked. The first thing, the main thing, actually, is housing. Britain has a housing problem, we all know that. It has been going on since the late 1990s.

    I forget exactly what the number is, but around the mid 1990s the average home in London was about four times the average annual wage, and in the country as a whole it was like three. The last time I checked that figure, which must have been just after the pandemic, the number had skyrocketed to like nine in London, so it doubled relative to average income, and it is probably higher now. It is probably 10 or 11, I do not know.

    Funnily enough, in our previous Sylvans debate there were some people talking about productivity and why Britain has such low productivity. Really, to understand why Britain is not growing as fast as it could, the answer is that Britain’s productivity has basically stalled since the global financial crisis, for various reasons. One is the overdependence on the finance sector, but another big thing is housing. Housing is one of the major contributors to low productivity.

    Why is this? Well, the more housing takes out of your monthly budget, the less you will buy of everything else, so there is less consumption that could be used to stimulate the growth of British businesses, especially small businesses. If half of it goes to a landlord or half of it goes to your mortgage, there is also the issue of cities, because cities like London are super expensive. People are unable to move to these cities, or if they live in one, they live in a situation where they cannot spend. Cities, as we know, are the heart of the productivity of any country on earth.

    So why does the government not do anything about the housing crisis? That is the truth. They have not done anything. They allow houses to be sold to Malaysians and Chinese, not Malaysians or Chinese here, Malaysians and Chinese in China and Malaysia. They sell to institutional investors.

    There is a recent study that is absolutely mind blowing. Only 10 per cent of all new houses in Britain are sold on the open market. So what you see in Zoopla and all these, that is only 10 per cent, and in London it is just 2 per cent. The government could do something about this. They could prohibit selling these houses to anyone other than an owner occupier, for example, and we would have a functioning housing market. If we had a functioning housing market, people would be able to spend more, there would be more productivity. But the government does not do this.

    There is also the issue that sometimes the government just does not do what other countries do very well, and there are a few things that governments can do very well. Everyone complains here that Britain does not build anything. HS2 is a complete disaster, infrastructure is a complete disaster.

    We look at the cost per mile or kilometre of rail in this country, and it is like three or four times higher than Italy. Italy is hardly an example of hyper productivity, but what does Italy do? Italy has a national public engineering agency. Any city in Italy that needs a new metro goes to this agency, which does the work, and everything is done in a standardised way, whereas in Britain every new infrastructure programme is going to be done pretty much out of pocket, spending a ton of money on private consultancies and whatever, and so costs skyrocket. So the British state is responsible for Britain’s meagre growth, not just for what it does do, but for what it does not do. I urge you all to vote in favour of the proposal. Thank you.

    The opposition on the British state and growth

    Good evening, everyone. The opposition’s position is that it is not the British state’s fault. First of all, every country wants economic growth, and we are not in a unique position. It is not as if the rest of Europe, or even the US, is growing. You may think the US is growing faster than us, but if you run some numbers, actually not really. China is the country that is growing the most. So we are all in the same boat. It is not necessarily just the British government.

    Then you could ask, the motion says state, but if we bring governments into it, are we saying this government or the last one? The Conservative government had no answer. Their answer was austerity, which basically was cut costs. A lot of economists, and you know the joke, get two economists together and you have three arguments, but a lot of economists say that the lack of investment over the last couple of decades, since 2008, is the reason why our economy is not doing as well as it could. But equally, that applies to other countries. Germany is having a huge problem right now with its car industry, because China has taken over, and it has not invested in its own long term economy. And then the Labour government is trying to invest.

    Now let me get to the point I am trying to make. It is not so much the government or the state, it is that we are part of a global community. What we have as part of a global community is the global movement of capital, for example, and that is buying up our housing stock, as the proposition said. That is buying up our businesses. The data says that a vast number of our businesses are owned by US private equity and US corporations, and when we invest in innovation, once our companies become viable or approach viability, then global capital comes in and buys them up. So there is no stakeholder capitalism. It is always shareholder capitalism, and those shareholders are abroad. So it is not the state’s fault. Global capital is free to move.

    What do we do about that? Now I am going to start agreeing with the proposition, in a sense: implement regulations. For example, if we wanted to buy Google, the Americans would say no, Google is a US national interest. If we wanted to buy Microsoft, no. So in the same sense, perhaps we should implement some sort of restrictions, not capital controls, but restrictions on the purchase of our companies and of our housing stock. Housing should not be an asset class.

    Again, what I am trying to stress is that it is not the state’s fault, that it is part of this system of global capital movement. Of course, we have also shot ourselves in the foot. The proposition says that our decline started in 2008. Another argument is that it really declined in 2016, when we voted for Brexit. We have not really done ourselves any favours. So it is not the state’s fault. It is our own fault. It is the media’s fault, for buying into some of that narrative.

    And of course, if we look at our dependence, we have outsourced everything. We are dependent on the US for energy. We are dependent on the US for our defence, and we are trying to pivot towards Europe. We are dependent on the US for finance. Every time you swipe your Visa card or your Mastercard, that transaction goes to the US financial system. So the point is, it is not the British state that is at fault. Whichever government came in, they would be facing these problems. We do not live in 1870, where we were a nation state. We are a country that is part of a global community, with capital flows and labour flows. So it is not the state’s fault. It is being part of a global system.

    From the floor: stay out of the formal economy

    Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I agree with most of what has been said today on this topic, and it is pretty damning, isn’t it? I will add some more damning to it. I have experience of trying to be an entrepreneur, and anyone who wants my advice, I would say stop, and do not try and do it in the formal economy. Do it in the underground economy.

    If you do it in the formal economy, the government wants to tell you how to do each item, what to pay your people. You cannot pay them what you want to, or employ them how you want to. The cost may make you deduct from the wages you want to pay your people and pay it to the government, and that is a huge amount of money if you actually work it out and you are trying to start a business.

    In my experience, the authorities will take advantage of you and try and load you with taxation that is completely illegal. They know you cannot afford accountants, and you have not got the time to wrestle, to go to this hearing and that hearing. Do not do it in the formal economy. Of course, you then run the risk that the authorities will find out what you are doing, and you will probably not know the ropes and how to do it that way, in which case you are running a risk.

    I think these are symptoms that can explain, as I have said in these rooms, that we are in a depression at the moment, worse than the 1930s. The researchers are still doing work on the 1930s depression, surprisingly, and the conclusion is that once you get into one, you cannot get out of it again. I have said how that works in previous meetings, so I will not go over it again.

    There has been hardly any growth in the British economy since 2006. You get no booms, and without the booms you do not get businesses putting investment back in to expand. We are stuck. The 1930s depression is thought to have been ended by the Second World War. I do not see a decent war on the horizon. I think we are stuck where we are, and I have no way of suggesting how we get out of it, so I will support the motion.

    The British state and growth: borrowing, welfare and net zero

    Mr Chairman, the state has presided over a huge surge in unemployment, the collapse in business confidence, and the jump in the amount that the government has to pay to borrow money. When this government came in, they increased the taxes on businesses, putting up employers’ national insurance contributions, and they also put up the minimum wage, so it costs more to hire somebody to do a job. We have over a million young people unemployed, because it is too costly to hire them when you do not know whether they can do the job, or even if they will turn up on time. So unemployment is rising, business confidence is at rock bottom, and investment is falling.

    Then you have borrowing. Borrowing is going upwards towards 3 trillion pounds. That is a three with 12 zeros after it, and we are paying the highest percentage in the G7, that is 4.7 per cent. That borrowing this year will come to 111.2 billion pounds. That is what we are paying in interest only. That is 8.3 per cent of total public expenditure in interest only, which is ridiculous. In fact, one could say that the Chancellor is as friendly to business as Brutus was to Julius Caesar. You all know what happened there.

    There is a feeling about defence. We had the Defence Secretary resign, we had the Minister for the Armed Forces resign, and two others all resigned, because they asked for 17 billion for defence and were only offered 13 and a half. Well, consider the welfare bill: 345 billion pounds a year, 345 billion for welfare alone. It is very difficult to cut the welfare bill. But what about net zero?

    Of course, we will have howls of protest from the climate emergency people, but if you consider that defence needs 17 billion, we have earmarked 13.2 billion for heat pumps, that is the government bribing you to put in heat pumps. Carbon capture, which has never worked, storing carbon under the North Sea, 9.4 billion. That has never worked and probably never will, and what is more, it will simply make energy generation less efficient and therefore more expensive.

    Overseas climate help, 11.6 billion. God knows what that is, but it is 11.6 billion. And Great British Energy, which does not produce any energy, 8.3 billion. Now I ask you, that is 42 billion earmarked for net zero projects which will not do anything for the climate. So that is the state for you. It is a question of choices and priorities, and our state has got its choices and its priorities wrong.

    From the floor: is economic growth what life is about

    I do not always actually believe what I argue, but I wanted to argue a different point of view and perspective. What I wanted to say is: is economic growth what life is all about? It might not be net zero. The fact that this gentleman is arguing about it, we might not even have a life if we do not invest now, and it might actually save a lot of money in the long term. The investments we make now might keep this planet, keep us alive afterwards.

    Also, the new generation now, they do not just want to stay at work till nine o’clock and have children that they give birth to and parent but are not actually there for. Now they can focus on more than working till 10 o’clock so that people like Elon Musk can get all the money for themselves. They are actually thinking about themselves and their lives, and there are millions more of them who are having a much better quality of life now.

    There is also an ageing population, which I am sure you will understand. There is so much demand now on the resources required by the NHS, and I think that is better use for those resources than just a few chief executives getting richer. And with AI, the entry level jobs for the younger generation are disappearing, and this is real. If it is a matter of priorities, this is our future. We should perhaps be using this money to support that youth and that generation.

    I do think that perhaps we do need to look at technology in the future. If anywhere, we do need economic growth. Maybe if we had done projects over the years and they were not the most efficient, we now have an opportunity to look at the most efficient ways of spending our resources. And the final thing I want to make is, maybe if we cannot grow, we need to be looking at allies and other countries that are growing, and it might help us unite with the rest of the world.

    From the floor: energy, ownership and borders

    I am going to use the state and the government interchangeably here. There are certain things that can be done to improve the economy. It is quite a broad topic, but I have narrowed it down to three components.

    Number one, with regard to energy, I think we need to be more self sufficient in terms of producing our own energy, and less dependent on other countries. I think particularly we should make more use of the North Sea oil reserves in order to fuel more economic growth. You cannot ban fossil fuels, and I think you need to get rid of this net zero, because it is actually affecting the economy negatively. If you have less supply of oil and gas and electricity, you are going to increase the cost, not just of the energy bills, but of general living as well, because you need fuel to run factories and to send food to the supermarkets. Some of the net zero policies are quite extreme. I think a minister said he wants to ban things like underfloor heating and towel rails, which I think is quite fanatical.

    The second thing is that the railways and the utilities should come back into public ownership, because if they are actually in private hands, the priority is profit. You can increase the fares of the railways, but the service can decline, because the problem is with the profits. If you renationalise the railways and the utilities, the surplus will go to other services that are also nationalised and in state control, so you do not actually have to increase the taxes in order to renationalise. I do not think we need to spend more money on defence, but I do not think we should be spending more money on welfare either.

    The other thing that is quite important is immigration. I think immigration is a good thing, but we need to take care of the open border immigration. Open borders is not a left wing policy.

    If you look at what Bernie Sanders said in 2015, he said it is a right wing policy. Open border immigration drives down wages and increases profits for big corporations, but because you are reducing the wages, it increases unemployment, so people are less likely to do menial jobs. That means you have to have more tax money going towards welfare, which means less tax money going towards health and school and education and infrastructure and crime and all the other stuff that we need. It puts more strain on public services, which increases privatisation, and it puts more strain on housing, so it increases house prices. So I think that is something else that really needs to be taken into consideration.

    From the floor: net zero and the price of energy

    I have not changed my mind yet. Maybe I do not have the experience of the British state deeply enough that I can come up with an idea, but the main reason I want to intervene is because a couple of people raised the topic of net zero and sustainability. I just want to earmark something. Net zero does not bring a higher cost of energy. It actually should put it down. I work on this on a daily basis.

    When you look at energy prices in Spain or in Europe, in countries where the energy demand is very much met with renewable energy, there are periods during the day where energy is free. In some cases in Spain, some of the promoters are finding that during peak days energy has a negative cost. This means the energy providers are paying the consumer to use energy. My parents back home in Italy get an email saying that if you use the energy between 12pm and 4pm, the energy we give you is free. So net zero is not the issue. It is not what impedes the growth of the United Kingdom. I do not know what is impeding growth in the British state. I just wanted to make this point. I do not believe that is the driver.

    A question from the floor: net zero in the UK sense does not just talk about the net zero initiatives, it is also things like the banning of licences in the North Sea. I work in oil and gas, which is why I know it. Do you think that impact is minimal on the economy? There are to be no exploration licences in the North Sea from the UK side, and the overarching process is that there will be no more UK side exploration.

    The reply: what I think is, when I look at Hormuz being completely shut down, prices barely touched 100 dollars in the worst of the crisis. So what I think is that our economy is already extremely efficient. I would assume the British economy is pretty efficient anyway. We do not simply need that much. I do not see that demand for oil and gas being so high that you need that much reserve. That was my point. I do not want to leverage it towards ESG and net zero, but that was my point.

    The British state and growth: the cost of complying

    The British state has for a long time hindered growth in this country by imposing costs on every one of us and every business consistently. They have outsourced compliance with all sorts of rules as a cost onto businesses, so businesses in this country spend an enormous amount on that.

    I think many people in this room think that Brexit was not a great success. It is fair to say economists have three opinions, as ever, but the chair will say it has probably cost us 2.5 to 4 per cent of GDP. Compliance has cost us, some economists’ opinions, four to six per cent, so potentially twice as much as Brexit, which everyone regards as a disaster, and that is a growing cost. We have talked about employment. Guess where there is actually greater employment: HR and compliance.

    What the British state has done is make decisions and expect someone else to pay for them. So when we talk about taxation, let us include the six per cent for complying with these rules. Net zero also has compliance costs, and that continual outsourcing of implementation, top down. We were talking earlier about societal change. Well, that is what they are doing, putting in the rules: here are the rules, you have got to do it this way, and you have got to report on it. So companies have these crazy policies where you can only employ certain people to keep the balance right. Corporations are sinking huge amounts of their turnover into that, and that is one reason why people are not investing here now, because there is that hidden cost.

    The point of the state outsourcing and imposing costs on everyone else is not just about businesses and corporations. Every one of you has been subject to this. The bonus of efficiency from digital technology has actually been used to impose the onus on you to comply with them. HMRC even shut down their helplines last year, for I think eight months, saying you do it, you do the work for us. That is a cost on all of us, on our time. And finally, I will say that we also have the most expensive electricity in the G20. The Chancellor, being the economics guru, has told us that AI will be the saviour of our economy, but it is powered by electricity, so I am not sure that is going to work.

    From the floor: economics as a work of fiction

    Chair, Sylvans, I am noted for my profound knowledge of economics, but when I was listening to some of the commentators, I thought we were having a line from the BBC. There used to be a programme called Listen with Mother. Or if you are not into the BBC, you could look at the Brothers Grimm, or even the Mad Hatter’s Tea Party, because these are works of fiction, and by and large, so is economics. As regards energy, I have heard enough hot air tonight to probably generate many houses, and there is a lot of hot air in the Houses of Parliament as well.

    But what values have we got? It is not about the growth. I really do think it is about time that was put to bed. Growth has got its limitations because of the finite resources of the earth, and it is one planet. A lot of these issues are world government issues: migration, immigration, fair distribution of wealth, and all this sort of stuff. Until we move to a world that understands that, these sort of little England type things, the British establishment, of course they are all right on their own patch. They own a large percentage of the land.

    I wanted to correct one or two things. I took the trouble to find out what the population of 16 to 24 year olds was, and the population is 6.9 million. There is only a million in need, so the majority of young people between 16 and 24 are doing something. You need to look into the individual circumstances of those million people, and how they find out those statistics. I know quite a few 16 to 24 year olds who work in charity shops or work in a cafe.

    Now I do not know whether they come into the statistics, so you can tell around the statistics all you like, but it comes back to what kind of society do we want. Do we want a more equitable society? A large percentage of the land is controlled by five per cent of the population. We know who most of them are, and they would not give you the time of day half the time, but they give their friends free accommodation, of course.

    From the floor: the household and the Ritz

    Well, I am with the proposition, because I think we are very close to being completely buggered, as they say. We are in such a mess. And why are we in a mess? I think about my own household and think about money coming in, and I think, what am I going to spend this money on? I have got to spend a certain amount of it on essentials. I do not have a mortgage any more, but once upon a time I used to have a mortgage, so I had to pay that. And I have got to feed the kids. So there is some essential expenditure that I have to deal with, and then there is whatever is left over. I have this discretionary amount, and I can think, hey, I will go on holiday.

    But I decided, when I was managing my household, that I was not going to go and stay at the Ritz for a couple of weeks every year, because I cannot afford it. Over the years this country has metaphorically been staying at the Ritz. We have been spending a load of money, like 3 trillion pounds, and it is going up and up and up, and we are in a situation now where income tax is just purely paying for the welfare state. How the hell have we ended up in this situation?

    I think the problem is that we have very poor politicians. I know some people will not like this, but I have always said that I would try and make politics far more attractive to more capable individuals, because the UK is technically a company, and we need the best people managing that company. The opposer mentioned capital, and capital will go where it gets the best return, and we have not created the environment to attract that capital. Over many years, particularly probably in the last 20 or 25 years, we have created a situation where it is more attractive for some people not to work. It is not those people’s fault, by the way. It is because of the way that it has been set up.

    A question from the floor: will you accept that 70 per cent of the welfare bill is pensions? Yes, I will accept that. And there is another thing. For the first time in a long time we have a Labour government in power, and their principles say look after those who are less capable of looking after themselves than others, which I agree with. But it is foolish to think that we can pay for everything blindly, like the triple lock. Everybody has got to pull back. Everybody has got to pull back. We are screwed anyway.

    The British state and growth: the case for doing far less

    What an interesting debate. The proposer almost had me flummoxed by taking the position that the government should be doing more, when in fact they should be doing far less. I think that on the whole, the state is impeding growth in this country. I think they have got a far ranging suite of policies that are based on ideologies and not necessarily on economics. If they were economics, we already know that there would be so many arguments that we would not be able to do anything.

    I think there is one tax that everybody, including all economists, agree on, and that is stamp duty. You want to buy a house, you have got to give a stake to the government. Why should they take tax off you buying a house? Why should they slow down people’s access to housing? We have already heard that housing is one of the biggest costs that limits our ability to enjoy our consumption. The state is enjoying our consumption by funding what it desires to fund. It is buying votes, it pushes into a welfare state.

    There should be more austerity, because the only way you are going to get out of this right now is to actually tackle that debt bill. But wait, the state has a solution, and it is not the solution that is going to work for all of us. They are going to inflate it away. They are going to print more money, and guess what, there goes your real growth. That is what we should be thinking about: real growth. I have heard all about growth, but our nominal growth probably does not look so bad, because the government is the keeper of the inflation statistic. So should you believe it? Is the basket truly reflective of your living cost? Can you feel your purchasing power increasing right now, or is it decreasing?

    It is the state’s prerogative to direct what they want from tax revenues. They believe that they should collect money from you as an individual, and that their allocation and their budgeting priority is your budgeting priority, because you, the individual living here as a citizen, are not smart enough to manage your own finances, so government should do it on your behalf. That is why they take most of your money in taxes. The marginal tax rate at the top brackets is insane. You add council tax on to that, you add all the friction licences on to that. They are taking all of your money. You could be spending that on consumption, which would be fuelling economic growth. Producers would see a bigger market.

    A question from the floor: it is consumption, but who owns the land in this country? That is why the housing is in crisis, because the Qataris and the feudal system own the majority of the land. The reply: but do not worry, the state will take it back when you die.

    From the floor: Tuvalu and Papua New Guinea

    Hello, everyone. Over the last couple of decades a body of evidence has emerged. I interpreted this motion less as being about the current state and more just about whether the existence of the state impedes, or in my view does not impede, economic growth.

    Over the last couple of decades a body of evidence has emerged that the biggest driver of long term sustainable economic growth is institutions, so things like rule of law, property rights, free and fair elections, and a strong and stable government or state that can enforce these things.

    An example of how this works in practice is in the South Pacific, which is where I am from. We have got two countries, Tuvalu and Papua New Guinea. Tuvalu is a tiny country, about 10,000 people. The highest mountain in the country is five metres above sea level, and it is slowly decreasing. You have seen the picture of the guy with the water up to his waist. Nothing grows. They have got coconuts and breadfruit, which is a tasteless, starchy thing that you do not want to eat. No natural resources or anything. They just eat mutton flaps and corned beef from Australia.

    Papua New Guinea is a country of 11 million people. It is huge. It borders some of the biggest economies in the world, Indonesia, Singapore, all of those. It is abundant in natural resources: oil and gas, agriculture, fisheries, all that stuff. And yet, which one do you think has the highest GDP per capita? It is not Papua New Guinea, it is Tuvalu. And what is the reason behind that? Papua New Guinea lacks a strong and credible government. So in this situation, which country would you rather be in? Would you rather be in the one that has the state, or the one that essentially lacks a state?

    From the floor: the courts are the state too

    Thank you, Mr Chairman, and thank you to the previous speaker as well, because that is exactly one of the points that I was going to make. We have had a lot of whingeing tonight about the current government. We have also had whingeing about the previous Conservative government. The motion is the state. The government of the day is part of the state. Previous governments are part of the state as well. There are many different features of that.

    The previous speaker mentioned the rule of law. The courts and the judicial system are part of the state. The fact that we have the rule of law, that if you have a business dispute you can have it settled within a semi reasonable period of time in the courts of law in the UK, is part of the state setup that we have here.

    By the way, the fact that motions about the economy are getting voted in at Sylvans is to me a significant indication that we have got a big problem, because no one in Sylvans a few years ago cared about the economy whatsoever. This would never have been voted in. We are talking about it tonight. It is very important.

    There was an economist called Thomas Hobbes, very famous, and I am slightly paraphrasing. He said man in a state of nature, life would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. What he is saying, his insight at that time was, without a government you will have anarchy, and everyone will be poor. If you do not have an organised state. Tuvalu has a more organised state than Papua New Guinea. I think there are more complex factors, probably, that led to that, many different factors that led to that outcome. Having an organised state is critical.

    Thomas Hobbes was looking at the tragedy of the commons. You had a little village, and there was a village green that was a common, and people would graze sheep on it, but they rotated them. If you did not rotate them and take them off at different times, the land would be completely useless, and everyone would be hungry. So having an organised government is critically important. Infrastructure, the trains would not run, roads would devolve very quickly. We would not have roads. So it is not just an island state in the South Pacific.

    We have to look at the British situation itself. Could the government be doing much better? Absolutely. Could the last government have done much better? Absolutely. But we have to look at this in the round as well, and that is what the motion says: the state. I do want to pick up on a couple of the proposer’s points, and I wish I had been debating him, because it is always fun, and he is brilliant. Some of the productivity drains that he mentioned are very true, but the lack of investment is one of the biggest ones. We do not invest enough in this country, and sometimes the investments we make are bad.

    A lot of the net zero stuff is good for the environment. It is not good for the economy. I disagree with one previous speaker on one priority, though. Investing in wind power, I think, is a smart investment for the UK to make. Another speaker was talking about solar power in southern Europe. It is a great investment for southern Europe. They have cheaper energy, and they will have cheaper energy as a result. We have great wind. Investing in solar in the UK is madness, because it rains, but investing in wind in Scotland is very valuable. So we have to make smart investments, and the governments have not been doing that perfectly. Take away the government, though, and it is chaos.

    The British state and growth: how far should the state reach

    Thank you, Chairman. Just to touch on the last point that was made on governance and government. I would probably say that the British government is fairly involved in how it makes its policies. It makes policies on virtually everything. But I am sure everyone here knows the South Korean example, the chaebol houses. South Korea in about 50 years went from a very impoverished nation to not, and it did that in a way that in some ways China is trying to replicate, by basically betting on a few key industries and kind of letting them run amok, which is why now some people joke that a single company is the de facto South Korean government.

    So the point I am trying to make here is that in some ways I am not necessarily questioning the concept of a state, but questioning the concept of the involvement of the state. If you compare a British state, which is really involved with the economy, to one that decided not to do that, take the South Korean example, you may now be in a situation where a few individuals are incredibly wealthy and very powerful, and the families have a lot of sway politically in the country because they are so economically important.

    That is not something you probably have on the same scale in the UK. So based on that, I would probably say that maybe the British state could be better. I am not quite sure which side of the fence I would have fallen on, but that is just one of the points I wanted to make.

    The chair draws the threads together

    Some really interesting speeches, and many angles taken up here. Is the government over regulating? Is the government investing in the wrong areas? Is it the government versus the state? Are they the same thing? Is it our own expectations and values that are at fault here? I would add: is the state and the government actually the proxy of the British people’s wishes, levels of information, education, bravery and preferences, and what role does the media have in that?

    I would remind everyone that the motion is that the British state impedes economic growth. There may be other factors impeding economic growth more, yes, that is true, but the British state can also impede economic growth even if other people and other factors are in play as well.

    Closing for the opposition on the British state and growth

    Thank you, everybody. Great speeches. The opposition’s position is that it is not the fault of the British economy, it is that we are part of a globalised system. Debt has been mentioned, and the narrative has been that we are doing so much worse than all the other countries. Actually we are doing quite well relative to the other developed countries. Japan has a 230 per cent debt to GDP ratio. Italy, we will not talk about them. The United States has a 120 per cent debt to GDP ratio. France has more debt than we do, Canada does. We have only got 100 per cent debt. We are doing pretty well, really.

    Also, when we look at foreign direct investment, this is the globe’s confidence in our economy. Traditionally we have been one of the biggest beneficiaries of foreign direct investment, and that continues to be the case. There is some data that questions that, and that is to do with capital owned by foreign corporations and foreign entities being pulled out, but overall, globally, we still are a focal point for investment.

    History has something to do with this. We have grown historically as part of being the British Empire. We are used to high levels of growth, but as we now are part of a global economy, we have to manufacture goods and sell them, and we have to do it on an even keel, on a fair basis, not like the beginning of the early industrial revolutions, where we nicked everybody’s resources and used those as raw materials and then sold goods. That was an unfair advantage. When we have to do it fairly, we have to compete with other countries, and we are not doing that badly. Everybody has the same problem. Everybody is thinking, what can we sell China? Even the Germans are thinking that.

    The points that have been made are okay. Should the government do this? Should the government do that? Is the government making the right or wrong decisions? All governments are trying their best to grow. The Conservative government chose austerity, because we wanted to cut down on debt, but the disbenefit is that there is no investment, and so we need investment, which is going to lead to more growth, which is what the Labour government is trying to do.

    The deregulation aspect of it the opposition disagrees with. Labour, it is actually quite flexible. It is really easy to start a business, and they have now moved into a contracting model, where previously you had to employ someone full time and now you can employ people on short term contracts, so it is actually quite a flexible labour market, certainly compared to the Europeans.

    There have been complaints about taxation, but taxation is needed to fund investment, and the point has been made that good governance leads to growth, and you need taxation to be able to fund good governance. The only reason a business can start up and sell goods is because there are roads that exist that allow goods to be transported all across the country, a legal system, and so on. All of this governance allows it to happen. Everybody is dealing with all of this. It is not just us. It is not the British government.

    Whichever government you have in place, and I am using whichever government as a synonym for state, it is being part of a global system. I personally think, the opposition thinks, that global capital flows have positives, but they also have negatives, in that they buy up our housing stock and buy up our businesses. So it is not the British state. All states are having this problem, especially Western states, which have traditionally benefited from colonialism. The US is an exception, because it is a hegemon at the moment, and it is predicted that as its hegemonic position declines, so too will its economic development. So it is not the state. All states are trying to grow. All states are having these problems. It is being part of a global system. That is the opposition’s case. Thank you.

    Closing for the proposition on the British state and growth

    Let us start by challenging some of the points that my opponent made. I think the state is responsible for Britain’s dependency on outsourcing, on global capital and on the US. These things do not happen naturally. I do not think capitalism is a natural economic system, or especially that free market capitalism is an organic system that just comes out of nowhere. These are all policy choices that governments took to create a state that suffers from these dependencies.

    These were deliberate policy choices taken under Thatcher, taken under Blair, taken under every other government since, and they have affected the way that the British state is shaped today. They chose to destroy industry and focus on finance. That made us much more dependent on global capital than if that decision had not been taken. So this is a specific weakness, I would say, of the British state. It is not every country that has gone through the same process that Britain has. France and Germany and Sweden did not make all those same choices. Poland is the fastest growing economy in Europe, and they are integrated into the global system just as much as Britain is. So I do not think that is an excuse.

    On the issue of differentiating the state and government, I agree that there is a difference, but governments make the policy choices that craft the state. So you can say that the state exists because governments made those choices, and Labour has had the chance. In two years it is impossible to fully transform the state, but they have had the power to do so. They have an overwhelming majority.

    Why is Labour so unambitious relative to what Thatcher did when she came to power? She came to power with an intention of changing the British state from its roots, and you do not see any of this under the current Prime Minister at all. He has had his huge majority, and he has Brexit to benefit from, because now there are not all these rules and regulations from Brussels, if that is what you think was the problem beforehand. So it really does not matter if you are a Labour or a Tory supporter. They have all let you down.

    Some other issues that people mentioned. Climate. I agree, net zero is not the issue. If you want to feel that it is, vote for the proposition. I am okay with that. But the government also has not done enough on climate. They seem terrified of appearing like tree hugging climate hippies. Insulation, for example, is a huge issue. Britain has the worst insulated homes in Europe. Partly that is because it also has the oldest homes in Europe, but where are the investments to help people insulate their homes? More heating costs equal less money to spend on other things.

    As with everything with houses, the money that your home sucks out of you is lost productivity, and that is less growth. Housing again: new housing starts in the UK have fallen since Covid. There is no chance whatsoever, on the current trend, that they are going to hit the 1.5 million new houses promised in five years. There is Britain’s medieval land ownership, where leaseholders can get fleeced because the landowner can raise the rent of the land, or where a property manager could raise your annual property management fee from 2,000 quid to 6,000 quid for no reason whatsoever, and all of this can be legislated against. All of this is money that you are losing because the government does not intervene.

    So again, if you think the government is doing too much, or if it is doing too little, it does not matter. The proposition is a valid point. As you can tell, I am clearly arguing something that might not be natural to me, because I am a left winger, and I probably agree with my opponent on almost everything else. I saw one speaker being shocked that I volunteered to argue for this position, but remember, this is not mutually exclusive to believing that the state can do more. If the state can do more, I agree with it. The state can drive economic growth, but it has not. The fact that it has not does not mean that the proposition is invalid.

    The question that we are debating is very clear. It is about whether it has driven growth, not whether it can. That is a whole different debate, and again, it is not exclusive to whether you think the government should be doing less, or if you think it should be doing more. The most successful economies on this planet are the ones that get this mix right, the correct mix of where the government intervenes, where it invests, and where it does not, where it leaves it to the market, where it leaves it to other forces. I simply do not think that Britain has the right mix, and because I think that, I think you should vote for the proposition.

    The vote

    The chair put the motion again: the British state impedes economic growth. Hands up if for. Thirteen. Against, please. Four. And abstainers. Two. So the motion carries: 13 for, four against, two abstentions.

    Further reading

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